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Fixing Bail
Samuel R. Wiseman*
ABSTRACT
A large portion of the jail population consists of criminal defendants
whose guilt has yet to be established. A growing number of states have attempted to reduce jail populations in light of budget concerns, and many federal and state statutes already direct judges to detain defendants only if
alternative conditions will not protect society or prevent pretrial flight. Despite these legislative directives, judges continue to jail too many defendants
pretrial. Indeed, although statutes often direct judges not to impose financial
conditions leading to detention, many pretrial detainees are in jail because
they could not afford the bond set by a judge. As argued here, the explanation
for this lies partly in the skewed incentives of trial judges.
This Article applies an agency cost model to bail, observing that the interests of judges diverge from those of their legislative principals, which causes
them to err on the side of detention and stiff bond requirements. Judges receive little to no recognition for releasing defendants who pose little threat of
flight or violence and are subject to few penalties for detaining them. Yet they,
unlike legislators, face the possibility of public scorn (and for elected judges,
lost votes) for releasing defendants who flee or commit crimes. Compounding
the problem, judges do not internalize the enormous costs to society of detaining millions of defendants pretrial. To fix bail, we must address the principalagent problem at the heart of the system.
Due to separation of powers concerns, legislatures typically cannot use
traditional means of monitoring and controlling agents, such as punishment
through compensation reductions or termination of employment. This Article
therefore proposes a novel approach—the use of mandatory bail guidelines to
rein in judicial discretion, and its concomitant agency costs, in the bail process.
Although relying on judges to assess risk was once a necessary evil, the development of statistically validated, actuarial risk assessment tools has made this
solution feasible. Relying on actuarial models instead of hurried, poorly-incentivized judges would reduce agency costs and improve accuracy, bringing
meaningful change to a deeply troubled system.
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INTRODUCTION
To a casual observer of the criminal justice system, bail might not
seem particularly important, at least compared to overcriminaliza-
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tion,1 wrongful convictions,2 mass incarceration,3 or other issues that
have dominated recent public and scholarly debate. But the decision
to detain a defendant pretrial has effects that extend well beyond the
interval between charging and disposition. Controlling for the type of
charges filed, defendants jailed pretrial—either because they are denied release altogether4 (as is increasingly common) or because bail is
set at a level they cannot afford—are more likely to be convicted and
to receive longer sentences.5 They are incentivized to plead guilty
even if they are innocent, particularly for low-level crimes with relatively short sentences—if defendants receive credit for the time spent
in jail awaiting conviction, the remainder of their detention time can
be short, or nonexistent, if they take a plea.6 Pretrial detention also
has criminogenic effects, as placing pretrial detainees with convicted
criminals increases the likelihood that they will pick up criminal ten1 See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (2008) (describing the overcriminalization problem and attempting to develop a
theoretical framework for addressing it); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based
Failures of the Criminal Law Through A Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327,
1338–46 (2008) (exploring the “political and practical” barriers to decriminalization through repeal of criminal laws and analyzing various forms of overcriminalization); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005) (describing symposium
exploring overcriminalization); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (describing criminal law as a “one-way ratchet that makes an ever
larger slice of the population felons”).
2 See generally, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(2008) (empirically documenting the causes of wrongful convictions); Exonerating the Innocent,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/exonerating-the-innocent
(last visited Feb. 11, 2016) (showing 336 U.S. exonerations based on DNA evidence as of December 2015).

See generally, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERAAGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that race discrimination is now largely
expressed through mass incarceration and documenting the crisis); Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena
Six, Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477
(2009) (documenting the effects of mass incarceration and critiquing the flawed justifications for
its use).
3

TION IN THE

4 See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497,
501 (2012) (noting that “in the last several years, national pretrial detention rates have increased
significantly”).
5 See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL DETENTION
CASE OUTCOMES, PART 1: NONFELONY CASES 25 (2007), http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/docview.php?module=reports&module_id=669&doc_name=doc (describing the length of pretrial
detention as one of the most important factors determining the likelihood of conviction); Samuel
R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1355 n.44
(2014) (describing this phenomenon and collecting sources).
AND

6 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2492–93 (2004).
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dencies.7 Detained defendants are more likely to lose their jobs and
housing during pretrial detention, and society loses tax revenue while
paying the costs of constructing and operating jails. When breadwinners are in jail awaiting trial, families have less support, increasing the
burden on public assistance programs.8 But despite the widespread
adoption of statutes creating a presumption in favor of pretrial release, detention is commonplace.9
Bail historically received wide scholarly attention,10 but this attention waned in the aftermath of United States v. Salerno,11 which
rejected constitutional challenges to a federal law authorizing pretrial
detention for dangerousness.12 Recently, a handful of scholars have
rejuvenated the debate, focusing on the continuing problems of the
pretrial system and the legal avenues for addressing them left open by
Salerno. One strand of this debate focuses on the problems with judicial assessments of dangerousness and proposes that judges use measures that are more objective in pretrial release determinations.13
7 See, e.g., Arthur R. Angel et al., Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 300, 352 (1971) (“The indelible impact of this incarceration, the exposure to
those whose way of life is crime and to persons who have lost all hope and are resigned to
failure, leave many defendants hardened, embittered, and more likely to recidivate once released, than they were before incarceration.” (footnotes omitted)); Laura I. Appleman, Justice in
the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1297, 1320–21, 1363 (2012) (discussing harmful effects of pretrial detention); Richard C.
McCorkle, Personal Precautions to Violence in Prison, 19 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 160, 165 (1992)
(discussing criminogenic effects in the form of aggressive precautionary behavior).
8 See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1356–57 (describing the economic effects of pretrial detention and providing additional sources).
9 See Marie VanNostrand et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, FED.
PROB., Sept. 2009, at 3, 5 (noting that, in federal courts, pretrial detention increased from “53
percent of persons charged with a federal offense to 64 percent” between 2001 and 2007, but that
some of this increase is due to judges classifying defendants as falling within higher risk levels).
10 See generally, e.g., ARTHUR LAWTON BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1927)
(noting disparate effects of bail on poor defendants, corrupt practices of bail bondsmen, and
other problems); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199–241 (1979) (identifying the consequences of pretrial detention and its implications for a defendant’s “journeys through the court”); JOHN S. GOLDKAMP,
TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 21–22
(1979) (describing how bail disparately impacts indigent defendants); Caleb Foote, The Coming
Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 995–96 (1965); Anne Rankin, The Effect
of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 641, 643 (1964) (describing how pretrial detention leads
to a higher likelihood of conviction and has other negative impacts on defendants and on
society).
11 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
12 Id. at 755 (affirming the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act).
13 See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 554 (proposing that judges use an empirical
model that better predicts dangerousness); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1–2, 62 (2003) (noting problems with clinical predictions of dan-
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These scholars note the superior accuracy of statistics-based actuarial
models that use numbers, not subjective impressions, to assess likely
dangerousness, and observe that more defendants would be released
pretrial if judges employed these models.14 Flight risk—the other
chief factor in bail decisionmaking—has been largely ignored, however.15 More broadly, directing judges to consider actuarial models
would help, but experience with judicial discretion suggests that it will
not achieve the intended results.16 Federal judges already receive information from actuarial models for about one-sixth of federal defendants in pretrial hearings,17 but they retain discretion to consider
subjective factors when making pretrial release decisions.18 Accordingly, the number of federal defendants detained pretrial remains unnecessarily high; as former Attorney General Eric Holder noted,
“Many of these individuals are nonviolent, non-felony offenders . . .
[a]nd a disproportionate number of them are poor. They are forced to
remain in custody—for an average of two weeks, and at considerable
expense to taxpayers—because they simply cannot afford to post the
bail required.”19
gerousness in a variety of contexts, including pretrial, and suggesting standards that would
require closer scrutiny of these determinations); Elyce H. Zenoff, Controlling the Dangers of
Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 592–93 (1985)
(noting problems in predicting pretrial dangerousness).
14 See supra note 13; infra note 140 and accompanying text (summarizing the literature on
the accuracy of actuarial models used in pretrial detention).
15 But see infra note 140; CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, STATE
OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 22 (2011), http://www.pretrial.org/download/
risk-assessment/PJI%20State%20of%20the%20Science%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%
20(2011).pdf (arguing that financial conditions should be set based on individualized determination of, inter alia, flight risk, rather than through the use of fixed “money bail schedules”); Am.
Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice Section Standards, Pretrial Release Standard 10-5.3(e), AM. BAR
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_stan
dards_pretrialrelease_blk.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2016) (same).
16 Timothy P. Cadigan & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Implementing Risk Assessment in
the Federal Pretrial Services System, FED. PROB., Sept. 2011, at 30, 33 (finding that in order for
judges’ reliance on actuarial tools to effectively reduce pretrial detention, “magistrate judges
[would have to] assume a higher level of risk in selecting defendants for release than they had
been willing to assume in the past five years”).
17 Id. at 33 (“The federal system averages about 26,000 pretrial investigations and reports
per quarter. Unfortunately, the [Pretrial Services Risk Assessment tool (“PTRA”)] is averaging
about 4,000 per quarter, leaving 22,000 reports without PTRA scores.”).
18 See id. at 32 (noting that when preparing a pretrial report for the magistrate judge, a
pretrial services officer may present a recommendation different from the one calculated by the
PTRA after consulting with his or her supervisor).
19 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the National Symposium on
Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110601
.html.
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The explanation for this lies, at least in part, in judges’ skewed
incentives—there is a significant principal-agent problem that must be
addressed if we are to fix the bail system. As an initial matter, trial
judges are notoriously busy and may have only a few minutes to
devote to each bail decision, thus making it unlikely that they will
glean the facts necessary to fully and accurately assess dangerousness
and flight risk.20 Worse, they have reason to err on the side of detention. Judges are far more likely to detain or set a high bail requirement than one might expect from the text of the statutes passed21 by
their legislative principals22 because their incentives substantially diverge from those of the legislature. Judges, particularly elected
judges, are wary of bearing public responsibility for crimes that go
unpunished—and new crimes that are committed—because of an erroneous decision to release defendants prior to trial.23 Erroneous decisions to detain, on the other hand, produce no similar negative
reputational consequences. Elected judges, too, may face pressure
from a locally powerful bail lobby.24 While legislatures, of course, face
pressure to be “tough on crime,”25 they are also subject to growing
demands from across the political spectrum to control the high costs
of detention.26 Unlike legislatures, however, judges do not internalize
20 See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and
Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2002) (noting that
in Baltimore City courts pretrial release hearings “took slightly more time when an attorney was
present: on average, two minutes and thirty-seven seconds, versus one minute, forty-seven
seconds without counsel”).
21 See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text (describing federal and state statutes that
statutorily presume that judges should release defendants pretrial).
22 More accurately stated, the “public,” not the legislature, is the principal. The judiciary
is a separate and co-equal branch of government; however, because legislatures write the bail
statutes that judges help implement, this Article uses the term “legislative” or “legislature” to
refer to the principal for convenience.
23 See Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe
for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 364 (2010) (“While it is impossible to predict who will
commit a crime while released on bail, it is easy for politicians in hindsight to criticize a judge
who granted bail to the defendant who re-offends while out on bail.”) (quoting Jeannine Bell,
The Politics of Crime and the Threat to Judicial Independence, in JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY App. F, 3
(2003)).
24 See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1398–99.
25 Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 326 (1994) (“Pretrial detention is politically popular because it symbolizes a government tough on crime.”); cf. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. 2003) (per
curiam) (describing a judge’s campaign comments regarding the need to use bail to “gain a
reputation for being tough” and to “make it very unattractive for a person to be committing a
crime”).
26 See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

2016]

FIXING BAIL

423

any of the costs of pretrial detention,27 nor do they receive rewards for
correctly releasing defendants pretrial.28 Thus, even when presented
with objective, actuarial models to guide their discretion, they detain
far more defendants than is necessary to constrain dangerousness and
flight risk.29
Agency costs,30 then, are at the heart of the problems with pretrial justice, and reducing them must be part of the solution. These
costs are the result of the heavy reliance on judicial discretion in pretrial release determinations.31 In the past, this reliance was justifiable
due to the lack of workable alternatives.32 But modern experience
with actuarial models in a variety of contexts strongly suggests that we
can create statistical models that do a better job of predicting violence
and flight than judges’ subjective impressions.33 In Kentucky, where
pretrial services agencies use actuarial models to assess defendants’
likely dangerousness and flight risk and make recommendations to
PROJECT 2 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/
spip_handouts.authcheckdam.pdf (proposing pretrial release reforms that would save states
money); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276,
1308 (2005) (observing that “states’ relatively greater concern with incarceration costs is more
likely to add an element of reflection to the political debate.”); Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings:
A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1975 (2005)
(“Governments face substantial costs in detaining prisoners that are as or more costly than the
incarceration of convicted criminals for the same period of time. In theory, these costs may
exert a modicum of pressure on the federal and state legislatures to change bail hearing rules to
limit the use of pretrial detention.” (footnote omitted)).
27 Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1703
(1996) (“Because judges enjoy more independence than do legislators, they feel less pressure
than legislators to choose rules on the basis of their distributive effects.”); see also Andrew
Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further the
“Interests of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561, 612–13 (“Because the judiciary does not internalize the costs of incarceration . . . judges may focus excessively on whether the defendant deserves
a particular punishment without considering whether the benefit to society of the defendant’s
incarceration is worth the financial cost of a lengthy sentence.”); Manns, supra note 26, at 1975
(“But prosecutors and judges face little if any accountability for the costs of maintaining pretrial
detention facilities and prisons.”).
28 Cf. Manns, supra note 26, at 1975.
29 See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 553–54 (noting that by using an actuarial
model tested by the authors, which would provide information to judges about defendants’ likely
dangerousness, a much larger proportion of defendants could be released—from 72,000 annually
to 99,882 annually—while “pretrial violent-crime rates would decrease from 1.9% to 1.24%,
which is a significant improvement.”).
30 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (analyzing the nature of agency costs and their relationship to the ownership structure of a firm).
31 See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 553–54.
32 See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 553.
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which judges must give “due consideration,”34 there has been a “5%
increase in the overall release rate,” while trial “appearance and public safety rates have remained consistent.”35
Washington, D.C., which uses a similar model, has also achieved
strong results,36 and more cities, counties, and states around the country are starting to deploy actuarial models pretrial.37 Providing judges
with better information and displacing certain clinical judgments with
actuarial determinations is a good start, but it leaves the judges’ incentives largely unchanged.38 Judges still retain full discretion to detain
the defendant. Thus, absent extraordinary circumstances, these models’ recommendations should be binding to limit judicial discretion
and minimize the potential for agency costs.
So far, while it has acknowledged the existence of the incentives
pushing judges towards denying release or setting a high bond requirement, the literature has focused very little on the discretion that
allows judges to act on them. Scholars have long argued that judges
must more accurately assess dangerousness for reasons of constitutionality, predictability, and fairness. Professor Laura Appleman has
accordingly suggested the use of a “bail jury” to advise judges in making pretrial decisions;39 Professor Shima Baradaran would require far
more substantial proof of flight risk or a risk of a threat to witnesses in
order to detain defendants pretrial;40 and Professors Baradaran and
Frank McIntyre have empirically explored criteria that would more
accurately predict defendant dangerousness, suggesting that counties
implement a “jurisdiction-specific model” for predicting dangerousness that incorporates these criteria.41
Yet all of these models would leave judges with a large amount of
discretion. Existing proposals suggest ways of better guiding judges’
34 KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.10 (“In the exercise of such discretion the court shall give due consideration to recommendations of the local pretrial services agency when made as authorized by
order of the Supreme Court.”).
35 ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, 2012–2013 POLICY PAPER:
EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL RELEASE 8–9 (2013), http://www.pretrial.org/download/policystatements/Evidence%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20-%20COSCA%202012.pdf.
36 Id. at 7 (showing that release rates rose from eleven to eighty percent and that appearance rates were at eighty-eight percent).
37 See infra text accompanying notes 241–42.
38 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
39 Appleman, supra note 7, at 1363–66.
40 Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 766–75
(2011) (arguing that defendants have a due process right to be released pretrial absent proof of
“substantial risk” that the defendant will threaten witnesses or flee).
41 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 532, 554–55.
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bail decisions, but none seem to envision significantly limiting judicial
discretion to reduce agency costs.42 This Article takes up that project.
Part I of this Article provides an account of the principal-agent
problem in bail, arguing that judges’ incentives push them to impose
higher bail requirements and detain more defendants than is necessary to achieve the objectives of their legislative principals. Part II
argues that these agency costs can be dramatically reduced—and the
quality of pretrial release determinations significantly improved—by
moving from the current system, in which judges have broad discretion to assess each defendant’s likelihood of flight risk and dangerousness, to an actuarial model, in which decisions are made on the basis
of statistically validated risk assessment tools. It also explores the limited, existing use of actuarial models in pretrial decisionmaking and
the small but growing scholarship on the promise of actuarial approaches in bail determinations. Part III focuses on a stronger approach, proposing the adoption of mandatory “bail guidelines” to
determine whether defendants should be released, released with conditions, or detained pretrial, and offers some thoughts on how they
should be developed and implemented. Bail commissions appointed
by state legislatures and by Congress could write and revise these
guidelines, as flexibility and improvement of the guidelines based on
lessons learned will be necessary. This proposal builds from the useful, if imperfect, model of the United States Sentencing Commission
and the Sentencing Guidelines. Part III also explores and rebuts the
likely objections to the use of bail guidelines, many of which emanate
from the extensive problems encountered with the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Mandatory bail guidelines will not be a panacea, but constructing
a theoretical basis for their use and beginning to explore their operationalization will bring us closer to fixing the bail system.

42 Professors Marc Miller and Martin Guggenheim have come closer to suggesting a less
discretionary model, arguing that “[j]udges should only use prediction to distribute punishment
or guide decision-making within otherwise justified ranges.” Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 379–80 (1990); see also Marc
Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 393, 402–03, 434–35 (1986) (in the sentencing context,
defining dangerousness as “intentional behavior that is physically dangerous to the person or
threatens a person or persons other than the perpetrator” and proposing specific factors that
should be included within dangerousness determinations, including the act and prior record).
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BAIL DETERMINATIONS

As described above,43 widespread pretrial detention imposes significant costs on defendants and society, and legislators who set pretrial policy are increasingly aware of them.44 A determination of
dangerousness or flight risk, including an inaccurate “false positive,”
often leads to the jailing of the defendant pretrial, which in turn
causes the loss of jobs and housing, and has criminogenic effects—
turning once nondangerous defendants into seasoned criminals.45
And erroneous release decisions, albeit presumably rarer for reasons
discussed below, allow criminals to escape justice and put the community at risk.
Judges weigh these costs against the need to keep defendants
from absconding or committing crimes while awaiting trial (and, perhaps, the need to be perceived as “tough on crime”).46 The language
of typical bail statutes seemingly reflects a reasonable balance. The
influential federal Bail Reform Act,47 for example, directs judges to
release pretrial detainees on personal recognizance, or with an unsecured monetary bond, “unless the judicial officer determines that
such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community.”48 Despite legislative treatment of pretrial release as a
default, and requirements that judges make certain findings when departing from this default,49 pretrial detention rates are high,50 and
have risen steadily,51 dipping only slightly when a recession drew atSee supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
See Barkow, supra note 26, at 1278 (noting that in the sentencing context, despite universal pressures on state legislatures to be “tough on crime,” some states have reduced sentences
and that these states have acted due to “greater attention to incarceration costs”).
45 For detailed discussions of the problems with pretrial detention, including job loss, difficulty locating and communicating with attorneys, higher likelihood of conviction as compared to
defendants released (controlling for the nature of the charge), and criminogenic effects, among
others, see Appleman, supra note 7, at 1301, 1318–21; Stephanos Bibas, supra note 6, at 2493;
Douglas J. Klein, Note, The Pretrial Detention “Crisis”: The Causes and the Cure, 52 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 281, 293–97 (1997); Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 42, at 424; Wiseman,
supra note 5, at 1353–54.
46 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 25, at 330–31.
47 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150 (2012).
48 Id. § 3142(b).
49 See, e.g., id.; infra note 131.
50 Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Our Journey Toward Pretrial Justice, FED. PROB.,
Sept. 2007, at 20, 23 (noting that during 2006, courts reported release rates of forty-seven percent
in federal courts (when immigration cases are excluded) and thirty-eight percent in state courts).
51 See id. at 23 (“An analysis of the jail populations for the 10 years between 1996 and 2005
reveals an increase in the percent of the population awaiting trial from 51% in 1996 to 62% in
43
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tention to the expense of jails.52 The explanation for this lies, at least
in part, in the broad discretion that judges exercise when setting bail,53
and the divergence of their incentives from those of legislatures.54
A rich literature has explored how actors—be they corporations
or Congress55—might best achieve their goals when the actors lack the
requisite expertise or resources to attain their goals, or when reaching
those goals independently would be too costly.56 In these circumstances, the entity (the “principal”) often employs an agent to accomplish its goal, and this decision involves trade-offs: although it allows
the principal to achieve a result that it could not efficiently reach itself, the agency choice imposes new agency costs.57 These include
monitoring costs incurred to align the agent’s actions with the principal’s goals, bonding costs that make the principal at least partially
whole if the agent fails to act in accordance with the principal’s goals,
and residual costs, which are the costs incurred when the agent follows
its own incentives rather than the principal’s, and which cannot be
avoided through monitoring or offset through bonding.58 When, as in
the bail context, agents’ incentives and actions diverge from the principals’ goals to an unacceptable degree, agency costs—the negative
results of relying on agents to carry out the principal’s will59—are
high.
2005 . . . .”); THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND MISCONFEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 1995–2010 1 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
pdmfdc9510.pdf (“The percentage of drug defendants detained pretrial increased from 76% in
1995 to 84% in 2010.”).
52 See COHEN, supra note 51, at 3 (“The percentage of immigration defendants detained
pretrial increased from 86% in 1995 to 98% in 2008, before declining to 88% in 2010.”); Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1400.
53 See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
54 See infra Part I.
55 See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 706 (2013)
(noting that in the context of Congress acting as the agent of the electorate, “the structure of the
agency problem in the political process looks remarkably similar to the agency problem in public
corporations” because “[b]oth involve elected agents acting on behalf of diffuse principals who
face substantial collective action problems in monitoring agents and imposing their will”).
56 See Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political
Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1989
(2006) (noting that in the sentencing context, “having the legislature enact legislation that specifies how each case is to be sentenced . . . is not practicable because of resource constraints”).
57 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 308–10.
58 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Agency Cost Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act:
Recalling the Virtues of Delegating Complex Decisions, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 663 (1992).
59 See Rave, supra note 55, at 694 (noting that “[a]gents may not work as hard to forward
the principal’s interests as the principal would, or worse, agents may pursue their own interests
at the principal’s expense” and describing these costs, as well as the costs of monitoring agents to
attempt to align agent-principal goals, as agency costs).
DUCT IN
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Judges, who often have only a few minutes to devote to each pretrial release decision,60 are far more likely than legislators (who wrote
the bail statute) to bear blame for releasing a defendant who flees
justice or commits a violent crime while on bail.61 And judges, unlike
legislative bodies, are not responsible for increased jail budgets, lost
tax revenues, and drains on social services resulting, directly or indirectly, from their decisions.62 This misalignment of incentives produces agency costs.
This Part explores how judges, acting independently, are unlikely
to carry out the will of legislatures and how existing solutions to reduce agency costs—through monitoring of judges by attorneys or constitutional and statutory challenges to judicial bail decisions—are
unlikely to be successful, laying the groundwork for the rules-based
approach explored in Parts II and III.
A. Judges as Independent Agents
When the incentives of the agent and principal are nearly perfectly aligned, then the principal might be able to appoint an agent
without incurring any of these costs.63 The agent will merely carry out
the will of the principal for a small amount of compensation or similar
reward.64 In the context of pretrial release determinations, however,
the alignment between the incentives of judges and legislatures is far
from perfect.
1. Judges’ Incentives to Deny Pretrial Release
A judge receives few rewards for correctly releasing a defendant
pretrial: even if the defendant appears at all required hearings and
does not commit any crimes while awaiting a determination of guilt,
the judge gets only the quiet satisfaction of a job well done. In contrast, there is a significant risk of public scorn if a released defendant
flees justice, or worse, commits a violent crime while on pretrial release. And the decision to detain or set an impossibly high bond for
even a low-risk defendant has few downsides.65 While no one wants to
be the object of public ire, the problem is particularly acute for elected
60 Colbert, supra note 20, at 1755 (describing the brief time that judges typically devote to
pretrial hearings).
61 See Swisher, supra note 23, at 364.
62 See supra note 27.
63 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 308; supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
64 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 308.
65 See Swisher, supra note 23, at 364.
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judges, of whom there are many.66 As one judge running for City
Court office in New York stated in his campaign, the judiciary could
use both bail and sentencing to “make it very unattractive for a person
to be committing a crime” within the city.67
Elected judges, too, might be subject to pressure from locally
powerful bail lobbies to keep bond requirements high, increasing the
number of defendants unable to make bail.68 The success of this lobby
at influencing legislatures69—who internalize both the benefits and
costs of pretrial release70—suggests that it will be particularly powerful in the judicial context where judges typically only bear the costs of
releasing defendants pretrial. Bail bondsmen consistently oppose efforts to narrow the use of money bail or otherwise expand pretrial
release because it directly impacts their bottom line.71 Imposing lower
limits on money bail, increasing the number of defendants who are
released on recognizance, and releasing defendants to pretrial treatment programs all diminish bail bondsmen’s business—and theirs is a
substantial business.72 Furthermore, prosecutors and law enforcement
officials may, similar to judges, be subject to blame if a defendant released on their watch commits a crime pretrial.73 Like judges who
want to appear to be tough on all crime (including the possibility of
pretrial crime), these groups are motivated to retain a similarly broad
66

See id. at 365.

In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (affirming determination of
misconduct and removal of judge from office). The judge also stated, “[w]e need a city court
judge who will work together with our local police department to help return Lockport to the
city it once was.” Id.
68 Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1398–400.
69 Id. at 1398–99 (describing successful lobbying efforts by bondsmen).
67

See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Cliff Collins, The Question of Commercial Bail: Bail Industry Wants Oregon to
Return to a System It Once Rejected, OR. ST. BAR: BULL. (Oct. 2014), https://www.osbar.org/
publications/bulletin/14oct/bailbonds.html (“Representatives of the commercial bail bonds industry make no bones about it: They think Oregon would be better off to revert to the bail
system the state ran before 1974.”); Laura Sullivan, Bondsman Lobby Targets Pretrial Release
Programs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725849
(last updated Feb. 24, 2010, 1:10 PM) (“[I]ndustry experts say powerful bail lobbying groups
have begun using Broward [County] as a road map of how to squash similar [pretrial services]
programs elsewhere . . . .”). Bondsmen have also opposed narrower measures such as providing
defendants with representation in the pretrial process. See Douglas L. Colbert, Coming Soon to
a Court Near You—Convicting the Unrepresented at the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State High
Court’s Sua Sponte Rejection of Indigent Defendants’ Right to Counsel, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
653, 707 n.318 (2006) (noting successful opposition by the bail bond industry to a proposed bill
for counsel in pretrial hearings).
72 Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1398–99.
73 See Swisher, supra note 23, at 368.
70
71
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anti-crime stance; thus, like other interested parties, they will lobby
elected judges against pretrial release.74
2. Judges’ Failure to Internalize the Costs of Pretrial Detention
Judges do not only err toward detaining a defendant pretrial as a
result of pressures from the public, law enforcement and prosecutors,
and bail bondsmen. They also fail, of course, to internalize the costs
of pretrial detention75—the money spent on building, maintaining,
and operating the jails necessary to detain the millions of defendants
who are not released pretrial, declining tax revenue from defendants’
lost jobs and reduced productivity, and the increased burden on social
services from these defendants and their families.76 Judicial salaries
depend only indirectly on other budgetary burdens, and the expense
of jails is only a small piece of the many public expenses, from agricultural subsidies to public education and infrastructure, that might cause
downward pressure on salaries.77 A judge will thus not directly experience a financial penalty for detaining more defendants pretrial than
is necessary to prevent pretrial crime or flight risk.
Furthermore, from the judge’s perspective, each detention decision is an individual one. The judge is concerned about the likely dangerousness or flight risk of the defendant appearing before her, and
likely does not regularly consider the cumulative impacts, financial or
otherwise, of sending thousands of defendants to jail.78 Resource constraints make it even more unlikely that judges will consider costs and
other effects outside of the boundaries of each pretrial case. In the
face of high caseloads and inadequate staffing, the judge has difficulty
adequately assessing the bail factors that she must consider, let alone
74 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005) (“No
other group comes close to prosecutorial lobbying efforts on crime issues.”); Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 42, at 340 (“Now, prosecutors and legislators unabashedly seek to use pretrial
detention to reduce crime and protect society.”).
75

See supra note 27.

See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1356–58 (estimating the fixed and variable costs of detaining defendants pretrial and listing sources).
76

See, e.g., Linh Vuong et al., The Extravagance of Imprisonment Revisited, 94 JUDICA70, 70, 76–79 (2010) (surveying corrections budgets in California, Florida, New York, and
Texas, and finding that these budgets ranged from two to seven percent of the states’ total
budgets).
77

TURE

78 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (2012) (emphasizing the need for “temporary detention”
pending trial if a judge determines that a person “may flee or pose a danger to the community”);
cf. Kim, supra note 27, at 611 (noting that the financial benefit of correcting a wrongful incarceration accrues only after many years have passed).
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additional factors that she is not currently required to take into
account.79
Faced with strong pressure to err on the side of detaining defendants and bearing none of the costs of pretrial detention, judges are
thus unlikely to act independently to accomplish legislatures’ stated
goals of limiting detention to very dangerous defendants or those that
pose high flight risks.80 Traditional means of changing agents’ individual incentives by, for example, compensating them for successful implementation of the principal’s policies or punishing them for
failures,81 are also not easily deployed in the judicial context. Varying
the compensation of judges appointed for life based on their individual decisions in cases might be viewed as an impermissible intrusion
by Congress into the judicial branch, and, at a minimum, an inadvisable approach because it would substantially curtail judicial
independence.82
Judges’ incentives could be somewhat altered by encouraging
them to take into account the costs of detaining defendants pretrial—
a simple means of attempting to change the agents’ behavior.83 Monitoring judicial agents by tracking individual judges’ release rates, as
79 See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 20, at 1755 (discussing how the appearance of counsel at
bail hearings makes the defendant more likely to be released pretrial); Betsy Kushlan Wanger,
Note, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled Promise of
the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 325–26 (1987) (describing how the lack of mechanisms to collect and verify information for bail determinations contributed to judicial reluctance to release defendants pretrial).
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a), (d)(2), (e)(1).
81 See Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 546 (2011) (“One common method for more closely aligning the agent’s
interests with the principal’s is to compensate the agent based on outcome . . . .”); supra notes
57–59 and accompanying text.
82 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 667–68 (noting that analogizing traditional principalagency relationships to congressional and judicial relationships can be difficult because “to protect federal judges in their role of sustaining individual constitutional rights against infringement
by a simple majority, our Constitution protects judges from most of the means a principal might
use to control an agent” and identifying “the limited opportunities for ex post reward or punishment of judges based on performance”). Varying judicial compensation could involve decreasing
judicial salaries, a violation of Article III of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
(“[J]udges . . . shall . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.”).
83 Cf. Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 50 (2008) (proposing that information on incarceration rates should be
given to prosecutors so that they can make more informed choices during charging, plea-bargaining, and dismissal, in order to remedy the issue of mass incarceration). Indeed, Professor
Gershowitz describes an information-sharing approach as “requiring [ ] one set of government
workers” to “shuffle some paperwork to another set of government workers,” an approach that
pales in comparison to the massive cost of corrections. Id. at 79; see also id. at 81–83.

432

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:417

some jurisdictions track docket clearance rates,84 would also be a
strong step in the right direction, as it might “shame” judges into internalizing some of the societal costs created by their decisions. While
judges might not be as easily incentivized by shaming as are corporations—which are motivated by profit and have sometimes been shown
to react meaningfully to information disclosure, public “report cards,”
and associated boycotts85—it would likely help. However, an information disclosure and shaming approach would likely only reduce, not
eliminate, the incentive disparity.86
B. Existing Proposals
Proponents of bail reform have suggested several thoughtful and
worthwhile ways of improving judicial decisionmaking. None, however, would directly address judges’ and legislatures’ conflicting incentives, and, unfortunately, few have found much traction in the policy
arena.
See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, ESTATS: UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL PERMEASURES 1, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JCS/casemng/eStats/judPerformMeasures.pdf (describing “monthly caseload statistical reports submitted by judges,” which
include data clearance rates based on “Total Terminations” and “total number of incoming
cases”); TEX. COURTS, PERFORMANCE MEASURES 1, http://www.txcourts.gov/media/696352/10Performance-Measure-Definitions.pdf (describing requirement that district courts report their
backlog and number of cases disposed or added to their docket).
85 E.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 115, 125–26, 126 nn.33–37 (2004) (summarizing benefits and limitations of the Toxic Release Inventory program, which requires polluters to annually disclose chemical releases, as a
means of changing corporate behavior that has, in some cases, led to substantial reductions in
the use and release of chemicals); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257,
286–88 (2001) (describing certain successes of the Toxic Release Inventory program).
86 Efforts to collect the information needed for public shaming of judges might also be
hindered by inadequate availability of information. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 19 (2015), http://www.policemag.com/resources/documents/21stcpolicingtaskforce-finalreport.pdf (emphasizing the importance of federal statistical programs to illuminate public and
private decisions on crime and other issues, yet noting the scant funds allocated to statistical data
collection and reporting); TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014 1–9 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf (providing
only limited pretrial data); MARK MOTIVANS, U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009 10–11 (2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf (same); cf. Catherine Y.
Kim, The Politics of Agency Enforcement Discretion 15, 26–27, 40–41 (Univ. of N.C. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2571068), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571068
(noting, in the administrative context, how reporting requirements “may fail to expose shifts in
enforcement policy” due to inadequate reporting and data and limited responses to Freedom of
Information Act requests); Karkkainen, supra note 85, at 287–88 (observing that the mandatory
reporting program in “one of the nation’s most effective environmental laws,” reduced, but did
not eliminate, toxic waste emissions).
84
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1. Expanding Pretrial Representation
Some proposals would give expanded representation to defendants at the initial pretrial assessment, thus relying on lawyers to make
arguments for pretrial release in each individual case.87 Lawyers
could point to the close connections of the defendant with his community and family, a strong employment record, and the lack of dangerous crimes in the defendant’s history, all of which might lead the judge
to set a low money bail amount (making it more likely that the defendant could afford bail) or release the defendant, with or without conditions.88 These individual decisions would collectively lower pretrial
detention rates.89
Improving pretrial representation would likely expand release
rates while also making individual decisions fairer.90 But the costs of
this approach are high, and with public defenders already stretched
thin representing clients at the trial and plea bargaining stages, pretrial representation does not appear to be a priority.91 Rough estimates of total indigent defense expenditures in the United States in
2008 reached more than $5 billion.92 Budgetary cutbacks during the
recession affected existing indigent defense programs for defendants
in the plea bargaining and trial stages,93 and the feasibility of adding
new programs for pretrial defendants seems particularly unlikely in
this fiscal and political climate, where bail bondsmen and other lobbyists have expressly opposed even modest efforts to expand pretrial
87 See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333,
411–12, 428 (2011).
88 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012); Colbert, supra note 20, at 1725–26 (“The [Supreme] Court
went so far as to recognize a lawyer’s influence in the outcome of a pretrial release bail
determination . . . .”).
89

See Colbert, supra note 20, at 1725–26.

Colbert, supra note 87, at 342, 411 (“[C]ounsel’s presence [at pretrial hearings] enhances the fairness and efficiency of state criminal proceedings,” and “[t]imely legal representation reinforces the long-cherished principle of equal justice and presumption of innocence”).
90

91 See id. at 410–11 (“Some states and localities justify denying a defendant assigned counsel [for pretrial hearings] by arguing that it is too costly.”).
92 HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC’Y AT GEORGE MASON
UNIV., STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL
YEAR 2008 72 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_in
digent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam.pdf. This number includes
both criminal and some civil indigent defense expenditures. Id. at 3.
93 Margaret A. Costello, Fulfilling the Unfulfilled Promise of Gideon: Litigation as a Viable Strategic Tool, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1951, 1956–57 (2014) (“In recent years, the economy and
fiscal position of state and local governments has affected funding for indigent defense.”).
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representation.94 Providing money directly to defendants to hire their
own attorney pretrial would face the same fiscal barrier.95
2. Eliminating Money Bail
Scholars have long called for Congress and state legislatures to
eliminate the use of money bail because the primary driver of unnecessary pretrial detention is unaffordable bail—judges set amounts tied
to the crime committed, not to the defendant’s ability to pay.96 The
majority of defendants awaiting trial in jail are detained because they
could not afford the bail set for them, not because they were found to
be dangerous or have a particularly high flight risk.97 This practice is
deeply inequitable: wealthy criminal defendants benefit from pretrial
release (and the lower likelihood of conviction associated with this
release), while poor defendants are detained.98
Nonetheless, repeated calls for the elimination of money bail or,
more modestly, for narrowing its use and introducing alternatives such
as pretrial services programs, have met stiff, often successful resistance99 from the powerful bail bondsman lobby.100 As introduced in
Part I.A.2, bail bondsmen are a highly organized interest group that
may have disproportionate influence from the perspective of regulatory capture.101 They have much to lose if bail is eliminated, whereas
94 See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. Bondsmen have also opposed narrower
measures such as providing defendants with counsel in the pretrial process. See Colbert, supra
note 71, at 707 n.318.
95 Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 42, at 412 (“Another way to increase the burden [on
the government] of [unnecessary] detention would be to pay detainees an amount sufficient to
hire a private attorney,” although “[p]olitical support for this idea would undoubtedly be hard to
obtain.”).
96 RONALD GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETTO 33–50 (1975) (criticizing the disproportionate effects of money bail on poor defendants); Foote, supra note 10, at 995–96 (noting
that the majority of defendants cannot make the “average” bail); see also John N. Mitchell, Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association 10 (Aug. 13, 1969), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/08-13-1969a
.pdf (criticizing money bail as making “an accused’s pretrial freedom depend[ant] upon his bank
account”).
97 THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE
OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 1 (2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc
.pdf (noting that in state courts, five out of six defendants who are jailed pretrial are detained
because they could not afford bail).
98 See Rankin, supra note 10, at 643; supra note 96.
99 See supra note 71; see also Wanger, supra note 79, at 330–35 (noting the lack of success
of pretrial services proposals, despite their proven effectiveness).
100 See supra Section I.A.1. Groups opposing money bail have begun to have more success
in courts, however. See infra note 118.
101 “Capture describes situations where organized interest groups successfully act to vindicate their goals through government policy at the expense of the public interest.” Michael A.
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each individual member of the disorganized public has less at stake:
the incremental cost of building and operating jails, and the small, difficult-to-discern chance that the individual will be charged with a
crime and then jailed pretrial.102 In the sentencing context, scholars
have noted that some minority groups disproportionately impacted by
“tough on crime” policies have begun to organize, but the impediments these groups face in the political process remain high.103
3. Reinvigorating Statutory and Constitutional Rights
Although there has been little recent focus on bail in the criminal
justice literature, a recent movement to reinvigorate pretrial defendants’ bail rights has grown as scholars have noted the injustices of jailing defendants based on their ability to pay and on hastily made,
seemingly arbitrary decisions about dangerousness.
Professor Jack Williams argues that just as prosecutors must establish culpability by clear and convincing evidence to deny pretrial
release under the Bail Reform Act, the same standard should apply to
proving dangerousness pretrial, and judges should never presume the
dangerousness of a defendant no matter the charges against him.104
Professor Williams would also shift judges’ focus from dangerousness
alone to a consideration of “whether there are sufficient release conditions to assure community safety.”105 Professors Marc Miller and
Martin Guggenheim similarly argue that due process in the pretrial
setting “requires an increased use” of “incapacitative alternatives” to
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO.
L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013). For broader definitions of capture, see infra note 374. The influence of
the bail bondsmen lobby also affects the proposed solution in this Article, as bondsmen are
likely to lobby against any legislative proposal to create bail commissions. See supra notes 69–72
and accompanying text. As discussed further in Part III.A, including at least one representative
from this powerful interest group on the commission could help to address these concerns.
102 See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective
on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 n.26 (1991) (“Due to the information costs to interest groups of discerning how over-harsh sentences might affect them, and the
organization costs of finding those with similar interests, legislatures would typically not face
interest group pressure for restrained sentences, and hence are unlikely to enact more moderate
sentencing laws.”).
103 See Barkow, supra note 26, at 1282. But see id. at 1282 n.25 (noting the public’s weak
voice in the sentencing policy process but suggesting that “[t]his may change” because “politicians from districts with large African American populations are facing increasing pressure to
repeal or amend some of these [‘tough on crime’] laws”).
104 Williams, supra note 25, at 386–88. “The [Bail Reform Act] contemplates three decisions in the detention process and embodies several standards of proof.” Id. at 380. These three
decisions are: (1) a culpability determination, (2) a dangerousness determination, and (3) a detention determination. Id. at 380–81.
105 Williams, supra note 25, at 388.
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pretrial detention,106 and Professor Laura Appleman, focusing on the
need for Sixth Amendment protections pretrial, would introduce
more procedural requirements to better assess defendants’ dangerousness and flight risk, including a “bail jury” comprised of community
members.107 Professor Shima Baradaran, who has written extensively
on defendants’ pretrial due process rights and the problems with predicting dangerousness pretrial, proposes that “judges should not
‘weigh’ any of the evidence alleged against defendants before trial”108
and that “defendants should maintain pretrial liberty before trial unless there is a proper basis” for detention such as safeguarding witnesses from threats by the defendant.109 And in previous work, I have
made a statutory and constitutional case for a right to electronic monitoring pretrial for nondangerous defendants.110
4. Judicial Application of Actuarial Models Pretrial
Several scholars and organizations have advocated for use of
models similar to those that this Article proposes as part of bail guidelines. All, however, would rely on more judicial discretion in applying
the models, thus failing to fully address the principal-agent problem.
As introduced above, Professors Baradaran and McIntyre developed
and tested an empirical model for better predicting dangerousness
(not flight risk) pretrial, and showed that the use of their model would
lower pretrial detention.111 They accordingly propose that judges deploy this model.112 The American Bar Association113 and National Institute of Justice114 also specifically recommend that judges rely on
Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 42, at 423–24.
Appleman, supra note 7, at 1363–66.
108 Baradaran, supra note 40, at 772.
109 Id. at 768.
110 See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1383–96.
111 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 524–56.
112 Id.
113 AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 101.10, at 5 (3d ed. 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_arch
ive/crimjust_standards_pretrialrelease_blk.html (“Every jurisdiction should establish a pretrial
services agency or program to collect and present the necessary information, present risk assessments, and, consistent with court policy, make release recommendations required by the judicial
officer in making release decisions . . . .”).
114 BARRY MAHONEY ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181939,
PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS: RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL 63, 65 (2001), https://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181939.pdf (noting that “[s]tatutes often list factors that judicial officers
should take into consideration in establishing conditions of release, but the weight to be given to
information concerning potentially relevant factors is within the judicial officers’ discretion,” a
practice that has been criticized because “[d]ifferent judicial officers, faced with the same set of
106
107
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actuarial models in making bail determinations and release defendants projected to be low-risk by pretrial services programs.115 The National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies makes a similar
recommendation.116 And the Pretrial Justice Institute recommends
that a pretrial services entity run risk assessments for all “defendants
in custody awaiting the initial appearance in court” and, periodically,
for the pretrial detainee population.117
All of these proposals would likely produce significant positive
change, but so far—with some important exceptions discussed in Part
II and limited litigation successes that have generated some reform118—courts and legislatures have been slow to adopt them.119
With crime rates at their lowest point in decades and the continuing budgetary fallout from the Great Recession, however, there has
been increasing interest in legislative reform.120 While sweeping legisfacts, often come to widely different decisions about release conditions,” and calling for “well
crafted and effectively implemented” delegated release).
115 See id. at 57–58; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 113, at 1 (“The law favors
the release of defendants pending adjudication of charges.”).
116 NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE 13
(3d ed. 2004), http://www.pretrial.org/download/performance-measures/napsa%20standards%20
2004.pdf (providing that “[e]very jurisdiction should have the services of a pretrial services
agency” and that the agency “should provide information to assist the court in making release/
detention decisions,” among other roles).
117 Pretrial Risk Assessment, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., http://www.pretrial.org/solutions/riskassessment/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
118 See Ending the American Money Bail System, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-the-american-money-bail-system/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2016) (“Since the beginning of 2015, Equal Justice Under Law has filed nine class action challenges to money bail systems in seven states. So far, as a result of our lawsuits, cities in Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana have reformed their practices to end the use of
secured money bail for new arrestees.”). Although these cases have not consistently led to the
adoption of actuarial recommendations pretrial, they have tended to eliminate the use of bail
schedules, which is an improvement from extensive pretrial detention caused by the inability of
defendants to pay bail amounts. See id.
119 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1400–02.
120 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 26 at 2 (proposing pretrial
release reforms that would save states money). Legislatures might also be willing to make reforms for reasons of pure political economy (e.g., limiting the discretion of judges to detain
defendants pretrial if those judges represent the goals of an opposing political party) while publicly citing public interest purposes, such as fiscal reform. In the sentencing context, legislatures
that have reduced sentencing discretion have sometimes pointed to fiscal concerns, although it is
unclear whether these concerns were in fact their primary motivating factor. See Barkow &
O’Neill, supra note 56, at 2009 (“[C]ausation may be running from the adoption of the sentencing institution to the decline in incarceration and the decline in growth rates of corrections as a
percentage of expenditures, and not the other way around.”); Dhammika Dharmapala et al.,
Legislatures, Judges, and Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1037, 1054–55 (2010) (noting states’ introduction of determinate sen-
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lative change—such as eliminating money bail and monitoring released defendants through pretrial services agencies—is unlikely,121
some change may be possible. To seize this opportunity, if indeed it
exists, any attempt to fix the bail system should address the agency
costs described here.122 Legislatures have already attempted to expand pretrial release by making release a default and listing factors
that judges should consider to assess the likelihood of dangerousness
and flight,123 but for the reasons discussed above, judges have not followed these directives.124 The next wave of bail reform should aim not
at guiding judges’ discretion, but at radically limiting it—a classic
means of reducing certain agency costs.125 The reliance on judicial discretion at the heart of the principal-agent problem in bail was once a
necessary evil;126 however, the rise of actuarial risk assessment in recent years provides the means to eliminate it.
II. PREDICTING FLIGHT RISK

AND

DANGEROUSNESS

Judges make pretrial release decisions with only weak legislative
guidance,127 and this grant of discretion gives rise to agency costs.128
Congress for example, directs federal judges to consider a broad range
of factors to assess whether there are conditions of release that will
ensure a defendant’s presence at trial and protect the safety of the
community.129 These considerations include: “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged”; “the weight of the evidence against
the person”; a range of factors involving the defendant’s character
such as community ties, family ties, and mental condition; and the
“nature and seriousness of the danger” that the defendant might pose
to the community or individuals.130 States use similar or stronger lantencing purportedly for purposes of concerns about incarceration costs but finding that political
economy factors more likely influenced these legislative decisions). One empirical study of legislatures’ expanding or limiting the discretion of parole agencies concluded that legislatures
“tend to reallocate power away from judges and parole boards when those groups have political
ideologies that conflict with the legislatures’ preferences.” Dharmapala et al., supra, at 1084.
121 See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1398–401.
122 See supra Part I.A.
123 See infra note 131 (summarizing the state and federal requirements).
124 See supra Part I.A.
125 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, 667–68 (noting that one of the “primary means” to control
judicial agents is “the promulgation of rules instead of standards to limit the delegation of authority from the principal”).
126 See notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012).
128 See supra Part I.A.
129 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
130 Id.
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guage, specifically defining the charges for which judges must release
or detain defendants pretrial.131
One result of this broad discretion is seemingly arbitrary justice:
the same defendant might receive either a high bail amount or release
on recognizance—two vastly different pretrial results—depending on
the judge that happens to sit at the pretrial proceeding and how the
judge perceives the defendant.132 Another, as described above, is increased pretrial detention due to the misalignment of the incentives of
judges and legislatures.133 Bail is an ancient institution, and for most
of its existence, the best option was to rely on judges to assess the risk
posed by individual defendants.134 Outside of denying bail to those
accused of serious crimes, legislatures could not reasonably hope to
identify and weigh all of the relevant factors.135 In recent years, however, the science (or perhaps art) of actuarial risk assessment has improved to the point where it is able to match or exceed the
performance of trained clinicians in gauging risk.136
Indeed, in the post-trial context, criminologists and legal scholars
widely acknowledge that actuarial projections of future dangerousness—based on a set of objective factors applied to each individual
case to assign a probability of dangerousness—are typically more ac131 See PEPIN, supra note 35, at 3 (“Twelve states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government have enacted a statutory presumption that defendants charged with bailable offenses should be released on personal recognizance or unsecured bond unless a judicial officer
makes an individual determination that the defendant poses a risk that requires more restrictive
conditions or detention.”); Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 509, 509 n.61 (providing
examples of these state approaches).
132 Mitchell P. Pines, An Answer to the Problem of Bail: A Proposal in Need of Empirical
Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 394, 408 (1973) (“Some crimes trigger different bail
amounts by two judges in the same courthouse. An unusual appearance, from the type of jacket
to the length of hair, may elicit different bail decisions for the same crime.” (footnote omitted)).
133 See supra Part I.A.
134 See Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 119, 122–26 (2004) (describing the history and purpose of bail).
135 See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text; cf. Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1341
(2005) (noting certain members of Congress who had “labored so hard” to develop the Sentencing Reform Act in which “a politically neutral body of sentencing professionals—the Sentencing
Commission—should set sentencing levels based on careful study of past practice and the best
available learning on criminology and corrections” and increasingly negative, political interventions of Congress in the Sentencing Guidelines).
136 See, e.g., William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The
Clinical—Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 293, 293–99 (1996) (describing
studies in the post-trial setting, as well as beyond the criminal context, that demonstrated that
actuarial models were equal or superior to clinical models in their ability to accurately predict
tendencies such as dangerousness).

440

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:417

curate and reliable137 than clinical models, in which a psychiatrist or
other mental health expert makes a subjective, individualized prediction138 after interviews with the convicted individual and certain referSee Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCCORRECTIONS 196, 199–200 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin Reitz eds., 2012); Grove & Meehl,
supra note 136, at 293–99; William M. Grove, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: The Contribution of Paul E. Meehl, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1233, 1242 (2005) (summarizing Meehl’s works,
and subsequent studies that supported Meehl’s conclusions, on the superiority of statistical models, concluding that “[u]nless and until the very unlikely happens, and a body of evidence
emerges that overturns the massive set of published studies favoring statistical prediction,” the
use of statistical prediction in predicting human behavior is superior to the clinical approach);
Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (arguing that actuarial methods are “equal or superior to clinical judgments”); Henry J. Steadman et
al., A Classification Tree Approach to the Development of Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment
Tools, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83, 84 (2000) (noting the “persistent finding that actuarial predictions are almost always more accurate than unstructured clinical ones”); Christopher
Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 118–19, 121–23, 150–57 (1984)
[hereinafter Slobogin, Dangerousness] (concluding that based on the few actuarial studies available at the time, the actuarial technique was “no better or worse” than clinical techniques, but
that actuarial techniques depend on information that is “more explicit and reliable” and more
easily challenged and questioned in court, as opposed to the “speculative” nature of clinical
opinions, thus recommending limited court use of clinical opinions); Christopher Slobogin, Plea
Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution and
Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism 29 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 15-4, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2583898 [hereinafter Slobogin, Plea Bargaining] (“[R]esearch . . . routinely
finds actuarial prediction to be superior to ‘individualized’ clinical prediction.”).
138 Clinical models have a psychiatrist or other mental health expert present a subjective,
individualized prediction of the defendant’s dangerousness based on interviews with the defendant and certain references such as family members and employers. See George E. Dix, The
Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 151, 175–77 (1977). Although psychologists and other mental health professionals receive
somewhat standardized training in their field, there is no one set of principles that directs how
they should determine the dangerousness of defendants. See id. at 169 (noting the lack of such
standards and proposing self-imposition by mental health professionals of “professionally-acceptable testimony as to the dangerousness of a person”). Organizations like the American
Psychological Association do, however, attempt to police and influence the practices of mental
health experts in making dangerousness predictions. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Psychological Association in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 6–10, United States v. Fields,
483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-50393) (arguing that Daubert should apply to expert testimony regarding dangerousness and concluding that mental health experts cannot accurately predict dangerousness in certain situations, indicating “it is highly unlikely that a scientifically
reliable opinion can be offered that an individual is ‘more likely than not’ to commit a serious act
of violence while confined in prison”); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 2.04, at 5, §§ 9.01, .03, at 12 (2010), http://www.apa
.org/ethics/code/principles.pdf (providing general guidance regarding “Assessment” and “Competence,” including that “[p]sychologists base the opinions contained in their recommendations,
reports and diagnostic or evaluative statements, including forensic testimony, on information
and techniques sufficient to substantiate their findings”; “include in their recommendations, reports and diagnostic or evaluative statements, including forensic testimony, discussion of any
137
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ences like family members and employers. Although the literature
has devoted less attention to the use of actuarial models pretrial,139 the
few studies that address this subject reach similar results.140 Indeed,
an increasing number of studies conclude that in the pretrial context,
actuarial models are superior to clinical models in predicting dangerousness.141 Actuarial tools can supplant judicial risk assessment, improving accuracy142 and reducing agency costs.
limitations on the data obtained”; and that “[p]sychologists’ work [be] based upon established
scientific and professional knowledge of the discipline,” but not providing more detailed requirements for forensic testimony); cf. Donald P. Judges, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in
Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Moral Disengagement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 515, 587 n.408
(2004) (discussing the limited attention paid to forensic testimony under the 1992 Code of
Conduct).
139 See Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Development and Validation of a Pretrial
Screening Tool, FED. PROB., Dec. 2008, at 2, 3 (observing that there have been few “multi-site,
racially diverse, empirically validated pretrial [risk] assessments for use in the United States”).
But see Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 554 & n.273 (proposing and running an empirical
model for dangerousness—one that suggests that judges currently “overhold” defendants and
that, if used, might better predict risk and lead to lower rates of pretrial detention).
140 See, e.g., 1 JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON, 1 GUIDELINES FOR BAIL
AND PRETRIAL RELEASE IN THREE URBAN COURTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAIL/PRETRIAL
RELEASE GUIDELINES IN MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, DADE COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT AND BOSTON MUNICIPAL COURT 8–10 (1988) (describing an experiment that encouraged
judges to use voluntary actuarial guidelines for assessing flight risk and dangerousness pretrial in
Philadelphia, alongside subjective determinations involving the severity of the criminal charge
that diluted the relevance of the actuarial assessment, resulting in “a slightly more effective bail
approach than the traditional Philadelphia practice” despite the dilution of the actuarial guidelines); MARY A. TOBORG ET AL, LAZAR MGMT. GRP., INC., PRETRIAL RELEASE ASSESSMENT OF
DANGER AND FLIGHT: METHOD MAKES A DIFFERENCE 1–2, 5, 105 (1984) (analyzing release
rates, dangerous acts committed during pretrial release, and flight, before and after Washington,
D.C., began using an actuarial risk assessment tool that separately scored flight risk and dangerousness for defendants, and concluding that “[m]ore defendants secured release on less restrictive conditions under the new system, but there were no offsetting increases in failure-to-appear
or pretrial arrest rates,” despite the fact that the pool of pretrial defendants had become riskier
in that they had more extensive criminal records and higher drug use); Keith Cooprider, Pretrial
Risk Assessments and Case Classification: A Case Study, FED. PROB., June 2009, at 12, 15 (noting
that the introduction of pretrial risk assessment in one county reduced “disparity and inconsistency in bond recommendations” and “expos[ed] the personal biases and inadequacies of subjective assessment,” and that with the introduction of the risk assessment and associated changes in
supervision, violation rates declined).
141 See PEPIN, supra note 35, at 6 (“Actuarial risk assessments have higher predictive validity than clinical or professional judgment alone.”); Timothy P. Cadigan, Implementing EvidenceBased Practices in Federal Pretrial Services, FED. PROB., Sept. 2009, at 30, 32 (“Pretrial services
investigation and supervision practices, just like practices in post-conviction . . . will make more
accurate decisions using actuarial data than relying on personal experience or gut-level decisions.”); Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, The Development of an Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services, FED. PROB., Sept. 2009, at 33, 33 (“Time and time
again . . . actuarial tools have shown greater predictive power than clinical judgment.”).
142 Lowenkamp & Whetzel, supra note 141, at 33, 35. Indeed, failure-to-appear rates remain stubbornly high. See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1361 (“In the seventy-five largest counties
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Despite the consensus on the value of actuarial models, they remain underutilized in the pretrial context,143 and it appears that no
county, state, or federal system uses them to meaningfully circumscribe judicial discretion.144 A growing number of systems instead rely
on pretrial services agencies (or similar entities) to run actuarial models and submit recommendations on release or other pretrial options
to judges, who make the ultimate decision.145 The legal literature, too,
has largely focused on the difficulties associated with predicting dangerousness generally, rather than the decisionmaking process.146
More meaningful use of actuarial models could have a substantial effect on a bail system that currently relies heavily on the ability of
judges to predict the dangerousness and flight risk of defendants not
yet proven guilty,147 a reliance that produces significant agency
costs.148 This Part describes the merits of actuarial models in the bail
context and the limits of both current practice and existing proposals.

in the country, twenty-one to twenty-four percent of state court felony defendants who were
released on bail or personal recognizance between 1990 and 2004 failed to appear at trial.”).
143 See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 558 (concluding that wider use of evidencebased tools would allow less dangerous defendants to be released while reducing pretrial crime
levels).
144 See Cadigan, supra note 141, at 31–32 (“The system as it operates is very much based on
looks, raw numbers, or counts and not on outcomes, risk, or any appropriate scientific
methodology.”).
145 As discussed further below, actuarial pretrial models are used in: Virginia, Kentucky,
Ohio, and New York; in one county or city apiece in Arizona, Minnesota, Texas, Pennsylvania,
and Illinois; in Washington, D.C.; and for certain classes of defendants in the federal system.
CHARLES SUMMERS & TIM WILLIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT RESEARCH SUMMARY 2 (2010), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PretrialRiskAssessmentResearchSummary.pdf; VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN PRETRIAL SCREENING
AND SUPERVISION 2–3 (2010), https://ltgov.delaware.gov/taskforces/djrtf/jtrf_sep26_HandoutEBP%20Pretrial_Revised.pdf.
146 Professors Baradaran and McIntyre propose a model with specific factors but would
have judges use the results of the model to make an individualized bail determination.
Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 554 (“Rather than judges relying on these national
conclusions [regarding the most accurate factors for predicting violence], we recommend that
local counties estimate a jurisdiction-specific model based on the probit illustrated here. This
will provide them with a prediction model best attuned to local circumstances. Once judges have
in hand these baseline risks based on past record, initial charge, and age, they can supplement
them as needed if there are extenuating circumstances beyond the data we have already accounted for.”).
147 See, e.g., Cadigan, supra note 141, at 31 (“The system as it operates is very much based
on looks, raw numbers, or counts and not on outcomes, risk, or any appropriate scientific methodology.”); Pines, supra note 132, at 408 (“Pre-trial release procedures are unusually vulnerable
to the subjectivity of the arraignment judge . . . .”).
148

See supra Part I.A.
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A. The Merits of Actuarial Models
Given the rise of “big data,”149 the empirical support for the superiority of actuarial models over clinical approaches is, perhaps, unsurprising.150 In the context of dangerousness determinations through
clinical models, which were historically frequently used in violent sexual predator detentions,151 mental health experts applying a clinical
model individually formed the criteria that they believe are most relevant to assessing dangerousness. These experts often did not rely on
any specific list of factors, but rather made an impressionistic assessment based on their personal interactions with the defendant and possibly some references.152 Of particular relevance in the bail context is
evidence suggesting that even if clinicians attempt to develop a mental
list of criteria and consistently apply it, these experts will not perform
this task as well as a computer model will.153
Actuarial models take a far more standardized and “scientific”
approach. While standardization alone does not guarantee accuracy,
the best models consistently apply154 a set of criteria that has been
tested for its ability to accurately project dangerousness and flight
risk.155 In a typical model for predicting dangerousness and flight risk,
149 “Big data” refers to very large sets of electronic information that require sophisticated
programs to be properly analyzed. See Jonas Lerman, Big Data and its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 55, 55 n.1 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/66_stanlrevonline_55_lerman.pdf (providing various definitions of the term).
150 See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 720 (2011) (noting the previously common use of clinical assessments).
152 See supra note 138.
153 Grove & Meehl, supra note 136, at 315 (explaining that if a clinician “attempts to do a
subjective, impressionistic, in-the-head approximating job of actuarial computation,” “the clinician’s brain is functioning as merely a poor substitute for an explicit regression equation or
actuarial table” because “[h]umans simply cannot assign optimal weights to variables, and they
are not consistent in applying their own weights.”).
154 See Cooprider, supra note 140, at 13 (“[O]bjective risk assessment . . . standardizes and
makes transparent the risk assessment decision-making process . . . by applying the same set of
objective criteria, thus minimizing arbitrariness, individual bias, and systemic disparity.”).
155 See, e.g., MARIE VANNOSTRAND, CRIME & JUSTICE INST., LEGAL AND EVIDENCE
BASED PRACTICES: APPLICATIONS OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES, LAWS, AND RESEARCH TO THE FIELD
OF PRETRIAL SERVICES 11 (2007) (“Pretrial risk assessment research conducted over the past 30
years has identified common factors that are good predictors of court appearance and/or danger
to the community . . . [including]: Current Charge(s)[;] Outstanding Warrants at Time of Arrest[;] Pending Charges at Time of Arrest[;] Active Community Supervision at Time of Arrest . . .[;] History of Criminal Convictions[;] History of Failure to Appear[;] History of
Violence[; and] Residence Stability . . . . [But a] pretrial risk assessment should be validated to
ensure it is an accurate predictor of pretrial risk in the community or communities in which it is
being applied.”).
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these criteria include the length of defendants’ past employment,
types of prior convictions, stability of the family, and a range of other
predictors.156 For example, in a model in which higher scores indicate
dangerousness,157 a defendant might receive a high score for the “past
convictions” element if he has a large number of violent convictions,
but a low score for the “employment” element if he has long held
down a job.158 The model then uses the weighted sum of the scores to
estimate the risk of flight or future violence.
Neither approach is perfect, of course, and the inaccuracy of
clinical techniques for predicting dangerousness is at times overstated.159 Based on a survey of the most cited studies in this area,
Professor Christopher Slobogin notes that, contrary to certain criticisms of clinical assessments as a “coin toss,” mental health experts
perform better than random chance in projecting dangerousness—
viewed generously, one out of every two projections is correct.160
Nonetheless, the range of accuracy of clinicians’ assessments shows
problematic variation, with studies indicating that fifty-four to ninetySee, e.g., Lowenkamp et al., supra note 139, at 4–7.
This is the common technique followed in pretrial risk assessment. See, e.g., id. at 5
(describing an experimental project to validate a risk assessment tool, in which “[a] higher score
corresponds to a greater likelihood of failing to appear or supervision failure.”); KIDEUK KIM &
MEGAN DENVER, D.C. CRIME POLICY INST., A CASE STUDY ON THE PRACTICE OF PRETRIAL
SERVICES AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN THREE CITIES 3, 8 (2011), http://www.dccrimepolicy.org/
images/Pretrial-Comparative-final-Report_1.pdf (describing the Washington, D.C., system,
where defendants are scored on a variety of flight risk and dangerousness factors, and higher
scores represent higher risk).
158 See, e.g., Lowenkamp et al., supra note 139, at 5–7, 7 tbl.4.
159 Indeed, many have criticized the accuracy of clinical assessments and have even suggested that “flipping a coin” would more accurately predict dangerousness. Slobogin, Dangerousness, supra note 137, at 111.
160 See id. at 117 (“Correcting for the problems with the research, the accuracy of clinical
predications even among populations with high base rates for violent behavior is poor, probably
no better than one valid assessment out of two; for other populations, the ratio would undoubtedly be lower.” (footnote omitted)); John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward
a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 11 (1984) (surveying the
criticisms of clinical prediction and concluding that “[t]here may indeed be a ceiling on the level
of accuracy that can ever be expected of the clinical prediction of violent behavior. That ceiling,
however, may be closer to fifty percent than to five percent among some groups of clinical interest.”). Furthermore, some studies might underestimate clinicians’ performance. For example,
some researchers that compared actual dangerous behavior of criminals released on parole to
clinicians’ projections employed a different definition of dangerousness than the clinicians did.
In some studies comparing experts’ predictions about behavior and actual behavior, it was not
even clear that clinicians had made a specific determination of “dangerousness.” See Slobogin,
Dangerousness, supra note 137, at 111, 115–16. Clinicians, who were not asked to define dangerousness, might have applied much broader definitions of dangerousness when assessing defendants (i.e., any anti-social behavior) than the authors used, thus making it appear that clinicians
substantially overestimated dangerousness. See id. at 115–16.
156
157
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two percent of individuals whom clinicians projected to be violent
were in fact not dangerous.161 While clinical models are not meritless,
they leave much to be desired.
To be clear, actuarial models are not currently (and may never
be) as accurate as we would like given the importance of the issues
involved, but there is broad consensus that they are an improvement
over clinical models.162 Whether judges are projecting dangerousness
in criminal commitment proceedings for defendants deemed insane,
for civil commitment, or parole, actuarial models are the preferred
approach. As Professor Slobogin and others observe, although the
relevance of actuarial models varies depending on the context in
which dangerousness is assessed and the standard of proof in the hearing,163 actuarial models consistently perform better than clinical models.164 Not surprisingly, then, although the literature on actuarial and
clinical projections of dangerousness and flight risk in the pretrial context is sparse, the existing studies show that actuarial models consistently predict a defendant’s likelihood of committing crimes or failure
to appear at trial better than clinical or layperson models do.165
Despite this, most county166 and state pretrial systems—where the
majority of criminal defendants are found—rely on individual judges,
who frequently lack adequate time or resources, to make the bail assessment.167 Most judges use both subjective criteria and, worse, bail
schedules168—lists that indicate the amount of bail that the judge
should set based solely on the crime charged.169 The crime charged is
161 See Slobogin, Dangerousness, supra note 137, at 110 & n.50 (citing Henry J. Steadman,
A New Look at Recidivism Among Patuxent Inmates, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 200,
209 (1977) (finding a fifty-four to sixty-one percent false positive rate), and Ernst A. Wenk &
Robert L. Emrich, Assaultive Youth: An Exploratory Study of the Assaultive Experience and
Assaultive Potential of California Youth Authority Wards, 9 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (1972)
(finding a ninety-two percent false positive rate)). Professor Slobogin noted that those studies
likely exaggerated the rate of false positives, however. Id. at 110 n.50.
162 See supra notes 137, 140.
163 Slobogin, Dangerousness, supra note 137, at 102–03 (noting that different contexts such
as civil and criminal commitment involve different meanings of dangerousness and place different burdens of proof on the state or the individual to demonstrate or disprove dangerousness).
164 See supra notes 137, 140.
165 See supra note 140.
166 Cf. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF COUNTY
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES, PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 5 (2009), http://www.pretrial.org/
download/research/PJI%20Pretrial%20Justice%20in%20America%20-%20Scan%20of%20Prac
tices%202009.pdf.
167 See Colbert, supra note 20, at 1755.
168 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 166, at 7.
169 Id. at 5.
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an extremely rough, singular indicator of likely dangerousness and
flight risk compared to the sophisticated actuarial models deployed
elsewhere, and judges augment this rudimentary predictor only with
impressionistic assessments reached after questioning a defendant for
a few minutes, at best.170 Bail schedules are the worst sort of “actuarial” instrument, and their widespread use is an indicator of both how
little time judges have to devote to pretrial release determinations and
how little accuracy appears to matter in most systems.
B. The Status Quo: Limited, Advisory Use of Actuarial
Assessments Pretrial
In the typical pretrial hearing, the use of actuarial data is rare,
and the judge spends several minutes, if that, hearing a defendant’s
story.171 The defendant often lacks representation,172 and the judge
quickly assesses the likelihood that the defendant will flee or commit
crimes if he is released pending trial. The judge typically must consider a variety of statutorily defined factors in making this determination. For example, as introduced in Part I, the influential federal Bail
Reform Act lists release as the first option that federal judges should
consider in a pretrial hearing.173 The Act lists eleven factors for judges
to consider in deciding whether to detain rather than release the defendant, including, inter alia, the defendants’ mental health, community and family ties, prior convictions, appearance rates for court
proceedings, and employment status.174 Many states’ bail statutes use
similar language.175
In practice, initial impressions and gut reactions to the few answers a defendant has time to give in a brief bail hearing likely influence the determination just as much as the statutory factors do.176
170 See Colbert, supra note 20, at 1755; see also MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 114, at 63, 65;
Pines, supra note 132, at 408.
171 See Colbert, supra note 20, at 1755.
172 Colbert, supra note 87, at 386.
173 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (2012) (“Upon the appearance before a judicial officer of a person
charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that, pending trial, the person
be—(1) released on personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond,
under subsection (b) of this section . . . .”).
174 Id. § 3142(g).
175 See supra note 131.
176 CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 17 (2011), https://www.bja.gov/publications/pji_pretrialriskassessment
.pdf (“[T]he majority of pretrial programs (64 percent) use a combination of objective and subjective criteria in risk assessment, and 12 percent of pretrial programs rely exclusively on subjective criteria (e.g., gut feeling, professional experience, etc.).”); Pines, supra note 132, at 408 (“An
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Further, some judges admit to using bail as a sort of “expressive” tool
to send a message about the seriousness of the alleged crime despite
the defendants’ presumed innocence.177
In addition to their impressions and inclinations, many judges—
sixty-four percent of large county court judges, for example—also rely
on bail schedules,178 as introduced above. These schedules typically
consider only the charge in determining the bail amount.179 While
judges may deviate from the schedule,180 and most may order release,181 release with monitoring,182 or detention in lieu of money bail,
bail schedules tend to be a dominant factor driving the judge’s bail
decision.183 The combination of bail schedules and subjective, impressionistic predictions by judges leads to release results that differ substantially among courts,184 judges within one court,185 and defendants
appearing before the same judge.186 It does not appear that these different rates consistently match differences in the dangerousness of deunusual appearance, from the type of jacket to the length of hair, may elicit different bail decisions for the same crime.”).
177 Pines, supra note 132, at 408 (“Judges have admitted using bail to break crime waves . . .
[and] teach first offenders a lesson . . . .”).
178 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 166, at 5, 7; supra text accompanying note 169.
179 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
180 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.1(d) (West 2015) (“If the judge or magistrate sets the
bail in an amount that is either more or less than the amount contained in the schedule of bail
for the offense, the judge or magistrate shall state the reasons for that decision and shall address
the issue of threats made against the victim or witness, if they were made, in the record.”);
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 166, at 6 (noting the Santa Clara County, California Superior Court practice of allowing deviation from the bail schedule).
181 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 166, at 8 (noting that all 112 of the counties that
responded to the survey “reported that non-financial release options are available to the court,
including release on recognizance . . . and release with non-financial conditions”).
182 See id. at 9–10 (describing nonfinancial conditions imposed on released defendants).
183 MAMALIAN, supra note 176, at 17 (“[J]udges are still dependent on the use of bond
schedules in making pretrial release decisions.”).
184 See, e.g., GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 140, at 210–11 (comparing pretrial
release practices in three county courts in Boston, Florida, and Arizona prior to the implementation of actuarial guidelines and concluding that “bail decisions were disparate—they could not
systematically be explained by objective factors,” and further noting that judges’ predictions of
dangerousness varied in range, as evidenced by misconduct rates of “16 percent of released
felony defendants in Dade and Maricopa to 30 percent in Boston”); VanNostrand & Keebler,
supra note 50, at 22 (noting that in 2006 in federal district courts, pretrial release rates “ranged
from a high of 74.5 percent released in Vermont to a low of 11.2 percent released in Arizona”).
185 Pines, supra note 132, at 408 & n.80 (“Some crimes trigger different bail amounts by two
judges in the same courthouse.”).
186 Id. at 408 n.81 (describing three defendants appearing in pretrial hearings before the
same judge on one day, all three for marijuana cases and all of whom had “no prior record and
no special risks of nonappearance,” with two receiving bail amounts of $500 and one receiving
$2,000).

448

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:417

fendant populations entering each courtroom. Judges, then, as a class,
do not appear to be consistently or objectively applying the factors
that legislatures hope they will in predicting dangerousness or flight
risk.187 Given the wide variation in judicial experience, temperament,
and caseload, it would be surprising if they did. Perhaps as a result,
some jurisdictions have moved to an at least partially actuarial model,
although none places meaningful restraints on judicial discretion.188
1. County and State Models
Most accounts of pretrial actuarial tools identify the Vera Institute’s Manhattan Bail Project, instituted in 1961, as the first actuarialtype screening program in the United States.189 Students from the
New York University School of Law, supervised by the Vera Foundation, interviewed defendants in the Criminal Court of the Borough of
Manhattan to determine whether they might be good candidates for
pretrial release,190 asking about the length of their residency at a particular location, their current and recent employment, relatives with
whom they had contact in New York City, previous convictions, and
other factors.191 For defendants who met at least two of the factors,
interviewers followed up with references to try to confirm the information.192 Staff then considered a number of additional factors,193
such as whether the defendant had a close relationship with his family,
whether the family had “special circumstances” such as “pregnancy or
severe illness,” the responsibilities that the defendant had at his job,
and whether his job would remain open. Then they determined
whether to recommend pretrial release on parole.194 The project was
experimental, however, and students therefore did not make recom187 See, e.g., GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 140, at 210–11 (noting that in a Boston study, where the authors examined the state of pretrial decisions prior to the implementation
of a risk-assessment model, “at the request of the judiciary, we even constructed an empirical
model based on the criteria suggested by statute since the judiciary told us that they followed
these ‘guidelines.’ This ‘legal’ model failed to be associated with the actual decisions of the
Boston judges, contrary to their predictions but consistent with the expectations of the guidelines approach,” and concluding that for truly objective risk assessment to occur, “explicit decisionmaking guidelines” are necessary).
188 See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
189 E.g., PEPIN, supra note 35, at 6; Lowenkamp et al., supra note 139, at 3.
190 Charles E. Ares et al., The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of PreTrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 71–72 (1963).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 72–73.
193 Id. at 73.
194 Id. at 73–74.
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mendations to the judge for each defendant.195 The defendants’ questionnaire responses were randomized and placed within an
experimental or control group.196 For the control group, students did
not transmit their recommendation to the judge making the bail decision, whereas experimental group recommendations were transmitted.197 This allowed students to determine whether judges appeared
to be influenced by recommendations.198
A small number of cities implemented pretrial screening in their
bail systems soon after the Manhattan Bail Project. Washington, D.C.
formed a bail agency—the equivalent of a pretrial services agency—in
1966 and, starting in 1971, directed judicial officers making bail decisions to consider dangerousness and flight risk in noncapital cases.199
The District of Columbia now requires its pretrial services agency to
“interview any person detained pursuant to law or charged with an
offense” and to “prepare a written report of the information for submission to the appropriate judicial officer.”200 The report must describe “the person accused, his family, his community ties, residence,
employment, and prior criminal record,”201 and “where appropriate,”
recommend whether the defendant should be released.202 Diagnostic
Pretrial Services Officers gather this information through background
investigations and client interviews soon after a defendant’s arrest,
and they conduct a formal risk assessment with a thirty-eight factor
point scale.203 Different factors, such as substance abuse, prior convictions, and whether there was a weapon involved in the offense
charged, receive different points, with the total score designed to indicate flight risk and the likelihood of re-arrest.204 The score places the
defendant in one of three categories, from low- to high-risk, and the
Pretrial Services Officer makes a recommendation to the judge “based
in part on the risk score and the defendant’s eligibility for statutory
detention.”205
Many county courts—about eighty-five percent of courts in large
counties—report having some sort of screening agency that investi195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id.
KIM & DENVER, supra note 157, at 3.
D.C. CODE § 23-1303(a) (2014).
Id.
See § 23-1303(b).
KIM & DENVER, supra note 157, at 8.
Id.
Id.
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gates certain defendants’ likely dangerousness and flight risk and
makes recommendations to a court.206 But much of this screening is
not actuarial: “[twenty-four] percent of programs [in large counties]
rely only on objective criteria in making their risk assessments,”207 and
twelve percent “rely exclusively on subjective criteria (e.g., gut feeling,
professional experience, etc.).”208 Even objective criteria are often
not strictly actuarial, in that they are not used in a careful, deliberate
fashion to assess a probability of risk; rather, they add together a variety of risk factors to arrive at a very rough score.209 The cities and
counties that have experimented with or implemented truer actuarial
models (in addition to Washington, D.C.) include, inter alia, eleven
counties in Arizona;210 Harris County, Texas;211 Philadelphia and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania;212 three Illinois counties;213 New York
City, New York;214 Lucas County, Ohio;215 Yakima County, Washing206 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 166, at 5. Approximately seventy-six percent of the
eighty-five percent of counties that responded to the survey exclude at least one category of
defendants from screening. Id. And out of all 3000 U.S. counties, approximately 1000 counties
rely on 200–300 pretrial services programs to guide judges. MAMALIAN, supra note 176, at 12.
The study provides no information as to whether the remaining 2000 counties have—or lack—
pretrial services programs. Id.
207 MAMALIAN, supra note 176, at 17.
208 Id.
209 Cadigan, supra note 141, at 31 (noting, prior to the development of an actuarial pretrial
tool in federal courts in 2009, that “[t]he system as it operates is very much based on looks, raw
numbers, or counts and not on outcomes, risk, or any appropriate scientific methodology.”).
Many of the county programs described here seem to use this relatively rough model.
210 MARICOPA CTY. ADULT PROB. DEP’T, MARICOPA COUNTY ADULT PROBATION FY2012
ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2012), http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/adultprobation/docs/2012annualreport.pdf; Press Release, More Than 20 Cities and States Adopt Risk Assessment Tool to
Help Judges Decide Which Defendants to Detain Pretrial, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND.
(June 26, 2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/more-than-20-cities-and-states-adopt-risk-assessment-tool-to-help-judges-decide-which-defendants-to-detain-prior-to-trial/.
211 STEVEN JAY CUVELIER & DENNIS W. POTTS, A REASSESSMENT OF THE BAIL CLASSIFICATION INSTRUMENT AND PRETRIAL RELEASE PRACTICES IN HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 1–3
(1997), http://www.harriscountytx.gov/CmpDocuments/59/Library/BCPP1996.pdf (describing
1993 and 1996 bail classification projects).
212 JOHN CLARK, ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL SERVICES IN
PHILADELPHIA 2–3 (2011), http://www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/report/ri/Assessment-of-Pretrial-Services-in-Philadelphia-Pretrial-Justice-Institute.pdf.
213 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 210.
214 Cf. Operation’s Pretrial Services and Special Programs, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY,
http://www.nycja.org/operations-pretrial-services-and-special-programs/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2016) (noting that the agency “interviews virtually all defendants in NYC that are held for arraignment in police detention, to determine their ties to the community” and “attempts to verify
the information provided during the interview then makes a release recommendation to the
Court assessing the likelihood of continued appearance in court if the defendant is released in
lieu of money bail”).
215 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 210.
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ton;216 Milwaukee County, Wisconsin;217 Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina;218 and Hennepin County, Minnesota.219 Others are in the
process of adopting actuarial models.
Virginia has used a pretrial risk assessment tool since 2003, but,
as with many other programs, not all defendants receive the benefit of
this actuarial assessment.220 Pretrial officers are required to use the
Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (“VPRAI”) for all adult
defendants who are not incarcerated on unrelated charges and have
been arrested for a jailable, criminal offense.221 Pretrial officers must
complete an assessment with this tool within seven days of arrest.222
The VPRAI is computerized, and officers enter data into the program
in three steps. In step one, the officer enters “yes” or “no” for nine
risk factors.223 These factors include, among others, whether the defendant has lived at his residence for less than one year; is a primary
caregiver; has been consistently employed for two years; has outstanding warrants at the time of arrest; has a history of jailable criminal
offenses; has two or more failures to appear in court; and has two or
more violent convictions.224 The program then generates a risk level
of low, below average, average, above average, or high.225 In step two,
the officer inputs any additional mitigating factors or risk considerations.226 For certain pretrial agencies, officers at this stage may also
check a box indicating that the defendant meets the presumptions of
bail specified in the Code of Virginia.227 In step three, the officer next
selects whether she recommends pretrial supervision, suggests terms
Id.
Id.
218 Id.
219 FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST. OF MINN. RESEARCH DIV., FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PRETRIAL EVALUATION: SCALE VALIDATION STUDY 1 (2006), http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/
4/Public/Research/PreTrial_Scale_Validation_%282006%29.pdf (describing the County’s “Pretrial Scale” that is used to conduct a “full bail evaluation” that identifies defendant risk).
220 VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., VA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT TRAINING: VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT (VPRAI) INSTRUCTION MANUAL 1,
https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/corrections/documents/vpraiManual.pdf.
221 Id. at 3.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 5–8.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 8.
226 Id. at 9–10. For example, the officer may describe recent employment or other life
changes for the Judicial Officer to consider in making the bail decision. See, e.g., id. at 10 fig.6
(“Although the defendant poses a risk due to residence and employment, he recently obtained
employment at American Auto and has purchased a home in the local area.”).
227 Id. at 8–9.
216
217
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and conditions for bail or supervision,228 and then generates a report
to be used by a judge or magistrate at the pretrial hearing.229
Kentucky also has a leading pretrial risk assessment and diversion
program. In 2012 the legislature required the state to follow an evidence-based approach to pretrial assessment, specifically mandating
an “objective, research-based, validated assessment tool”230 that
would categorize defendants as low, medium, and high risk.231 The
use of this tool has increased the percentage of defendants released
pretrial by approximately five percent, while pretrial crime rates have
remained the same.232 In 2013, all counties in Kentucky began using
an actuarial pretrial risk assessment tool—the Public Safety Assessment—developed and empirically tested by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.233 The Kentucky Legislature views the state’s risk
assessment approach as both requiring more consideration of actuarial data and of somewhat limiting judicial exercise of discretion in
setting bail, although judges still make the final pretrial release decision and may consider factors beyond the actuarial data.234
Ohio takes a similar approach pretrial. The state contracted with
the University of Cincinnati to develop the Ohio Risk Assessment
System.235 Experts developed this risk assessment model by conducting interviews with defendants to identify relevant factors for the
228 Id. at 11–12. Examples of terms and conditions include refraining from drug and alcohol use or avoiding contact with victims. Id.
229 Id. at 12.
230 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010 (West 2015); see also KY. DEP’T OF PUB. ADVOCACY,
KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RELEASE MANUAL 33–34 (2013), http://dpa.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/D45BB6
32-4BCA-4BE6-B396-8CB20D917352/0/PretrialReleaseManualFINAL071713.pdf (describing
the pretrial risk assessment system that the State of Kentucky has implemented).
231 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2015).
232 See PEPIN, supra note 35, at 8; cf. Eileen Sullivan & Ronnie Greene, States Predict Inmates’ Future Crimes With Secretive Surveys, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 24, 2015, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/027a00d70782476eb7cd07fbcca40fc2/states-predict-inmates-future-crimessecretive-surveys (citing Ed Monahan, Kentucky’s Public Advocate, who provides a lower estimate of a three percent increase in number of defendants released before trial). Jail populations
in other areas using pretrial risk assessment have declined even more, with a drop of nearly
twenty percent in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND.,
supra note 210.
233 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL
RISK ASSESSMENT 4–5 (2013), http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Developing%20a%20
National%20Model%20for%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20-%20LJAF%202013.pdf.
234 See KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.10 (requiring courts in “the exercise” of their pretrial determination “discretion” to give due consideration to pretrial services agency recommendations).
235 EDWARD LATESSA ET AL., UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, CREATION AND VALIDATION OF THE
OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM FINAL REPORT 2 (2009), http://www.ocjs.ohio.gov/ORAS_Final
Report.pdf.
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model.236 They created five assessment tools and then validated the
tools by “examining the predictive power of the assessment instruments” and their ability to “significantly distinguish between risk
levels.”237 Many courts in New York State also use risk-screening
tools pretrial, although the state has not developed a statewide tool.238
Similarly, in Colorado twelve counties conduct pretrial risk assessments and make recommendations to judges, although their risk assessment tools differ.239 A statewide tool, based on empirical
assessments of the factors that most strongly predict pretrial misconduct, is now available to these counties.240 And the actuarial Public
Safety Assessment deployed in Kentucky will also be used throughout
Arizona and New Jersey,241 and it will soon be ready for national deployment in any jurisdiction that chooses to use the tool.242
Many states appear to have considered the use of actuarial pretrial risk assessment—the Conference of State Court Administrators
specifically recommends this method—but the Conference notes that
“there is resistance to changing the status quo from those who are
comfortable with or profit from the existing system.”243
2. Federal Programs
Unlike counties and states, where the use of actuarial models to
advise judges pretrial is rare but growing,244 the federal pretrial services system uses an actuarial risk assessment tool for pretrial defendants in nearly all districts.245 However, the tool—apparently due to
resource constraints or a stubborn refusal of certain districts to proId.
Id.
238 See CRIME & JUSTICE INST., ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL SERVICES IN NEW YORK STATE
6–7, 23 (2014), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/opca/pdfs/NYS-Pretrial-Release-Report-7-12014.pdf.
239 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., THE COLORADO PRETRIAL ASSESSMENT TOOL
(CPAT) 5 (2012), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/CO%20Pretrial%20Assess
ment%20Tool%20Report%20Rev%20-%20PJI%202012.pdf.
240 Id. at 5, 19.
241 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 210.
242 Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture With Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html
?mabReward=CTM&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&region=CColumn&module=Recom
mendation&src=rechp&WT.nav=RecEngine&_r=0.
243 PEPIN, supra note 35, at 10.
244 See Dewan, supra note 242 (noting that “fewer than 10 percent of jurisdictions use”
“scientifically validated risk assessments”).
245 Cadigan & Lowenkamp, supra note 16, at 33 (“National implementation was completed
in almost all 93 districts by August 2011.”).
236
237
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duce reports—is used for only about one-sixth of the defendants
processed through the system.246 The PTRA, developed in 2009 at the
direction of the Office of U.S. Courts and the Office of the Federal
Detention Trustee, uses eleven scored factors to assess a defendant’s
risk, and nine unscored factors that are used for research purposes.247
Each of the factors can receive zero to two points, and, similar to the
state and local models, the total points determine the overall risk
score.248 Risk scores, in turn, place a defendant in one of five risk
categories.249 Pretrial officers trained and certified in using the tool
generate a report with a score and provide the report to a judge, who
makes the final bail decision.250
As seen above, although the use of actuarial risk assessment pretrial is still rare, it is becoming more common. This is a very welcome
development, but all of the proposed and deployed systems so far
share a common feature that threatens to undermine their effectiveness: they maintain a prominent role for judges, thus leaving a large
space for subjective, layperson determinations.251 As discussed in Part
I, although some jurisdictions have seen increases in pretrial release
by preparing risk reports and providing them to judges,252 merely
making actuarial predictions available to judges is a very important,
yet partial, step.253 Rather than informing judicial discretion, actuarial
instruments should limit it. The following Part argues that the use of
mandatory bail guidelines based on actuarial risk assessment would
address the principal-agent problem in bail and improve the quality of
pretrial decisionmaking.
III. IMPROVING PRETRIAL DETENTION DECISIONMAKING:
IMPLEMENTING A SYSTEM OF MANDATORY
BAIL GUIDELINES
As discussed in Part I, the current methods of assessing likely
dangerousness and the risk of flight in the pretrial context create a
major agency cost problem, one in which judges fail to follow the di246 Id. (“The federal system averages about 26,000 pretrial investigations and reports per
quarter. Unfortunately, the PTRA is averaging about 4,000 per quarter, leaving 22,000 reports
without the PTRA scores.”).
247 Id. at 32. The nine unscored factors, although they do not contribute to the overall risk
score, are “analyzed for future revisions aimed at improving the predictive value of the tool.” Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 See supra Part I.B.4.
252 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
253 See supra Part I.B.4.
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rectives of their principals—directives that often would have judges
detain defendants pretrial only if alternative conditions would not assure appearance at trial and would inadequately protect society from
dangerous arrestees.254 Judicial discretion is by no means the sole
cause of the pretrial detention crisis. Indeed, scholars have only recently begun to empirically examine the relative importance of the
variety of factors affecting outcomes, including discretion, judges’ resource constraints, and the general lack of pretrial legal representation.255 But discretion seems to be a significant factor, as suggested by
the fact that when judges’ discretion is more constrained, it appears
that more defendants are released without a concomitant increase in
crime or flight.256 Yet legislatures cannot use traditional means of controlling agents. They cannot easily reduce judges’ salaries or fire them
for insubordination.257 In light of the limits of existing approaches to
reining in agency costs in bail, this Part assesses how legislatures could
best align judicial and congressional incentives in pretrial detention
using relatively specific rules for assessing dangerousness and the risk
of flight. Although the modest changes discussed in Part I could accomplish some of this alignment, this Part focuses on a more vigorous
approach. Specifically, it proposes that Congress and state legislatures
form, respectively, federal and state bail commissions that use actuarial models to prescribe mandatory bail guidelines for judges to follow. Under this proposal, judges may depart from these prescriptions
only in limited ways.
Limiting judicial discretion would not alone address agency costs,
but it would free up valuable judicial time for other important tasks
and would likely move bail decisions substantially closer to those envisioned by Congress and state legislatures.258 Risk assessment tools undergo constant revision, however, and release thresholds must be
flexible to address community needs and experience; thus, actuarial

254

See supra note 131.

See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 553 (noting that a model without
judicial discretion would produce more efficient results); Colbert, supra note 87 at 342 (explaining that a lack of representation at pretrial stages produces inequitable results); Pines, supra note
132, at 408 (describing how the judge’s subjective impression of the defendant greatly affects the
pretrial outcome).
255

256

See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.

257

See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.

Cf. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 669–73 (describing the effects of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 as restraining the discretion of judges in the sentencing context and thus
addressing agency costs).
258
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approaches are difficult for legislatures to enact directly.259 Crafting
these guidelines will require expertise, flexibility, and a degree of political independence, all of which point toward the creation of agencies, or bail commissions, charged with that task.260 That this Article’s
proposed commissions bear more than a passing resemblance to the
United States Sentencing Commission is not a coincidence; the Commission and its Sentencing Guidelines provide a useful, if imperfect,
model for addressing the challenges of drafting bail guidelines.261 Indeed, the history of the sentencing reform movement reflects many of
the challenges of the current bail system, with judges, who had nearly
“unfettered discretion” in sentencing,262 issuing widely differing
sentences for defendants with similar characteristics who were convicted of the same crimes.263 The length of each defendant’s sentence
was primarily based on an assessment of the defendant’s criminal history and the nature of the crime for which he was convicted, and the
judge relied on an individual expert’s assessment of the likelihood of
rehabilitating each defendant.264 The more difficult that rehabilitation
likely would be, the longer the sentence imposed.265 This system of
individualized assessment drove the disparate sentences that would
become the target of sentencing reform and mandatory guidelines, as
did concerns that judges were too politically influenced.266 The public,
saturated with frequent media accounts of heinous crimes, largely believed that sentences issued under this discretionary system were too
lenient, but some favoring sentencing reform were also concerned
about judicial pressures to be increasingly “tough on crime” and not
sufficiently concerned with the societal costs of increased
incarceration.267
259 Cf. Barkow, supra note 74, at 743 & n.80 (describing the difficulty that legislatures face
in addressing the issue of computing sentences).
260 Cf. id. at 742–43.
261 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 672–73.
262 Id. at 659–60.
263 Id. at 660 (noting that one problem that the the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 attempted to address was the “disparity in the sentences levied by different judges”).
264 See Barkow, supra note 74, at 737 (“Sentencing experts initially made recommendations
on how a particular defendant should be sentenced based on that defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation. They were experts in individuation.”).
265 Id. at 739–41.
266 Id. at 742 (“Sentencing reformers from both ends of the political spectrum believed that
the solution was to set sentencing policy in the aggregate, because they thought that would eliminate the disparity, irrationality, and unpredictability that both sides found so troubling.”).
267 See id. at 759 (explaining that one member of the House of Representatives, who proposed a sentencing commission composed entirely of judges, believed that “ ‘a presidentiallyappointed panel can too easily be dominated by political interests’ and might succumb to pres-
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The problems with judicial discretion were in part problems of
agency cost.268 Judges acting on behalf of Congress and state legislatures, which set criminal justice policies, failed to issue uniform
sentences.269 Because they did not respond directly to an electorate or
to Congress,270 judicial agents did not account for the costs of prisons
in issuing long sentences, and they harbored vastly different opinions
about the appropriate severity of punishments and the ability of defendants to be rehabilitated.271 The rules that emerged from the 1984
Sentencing Reform Act were thus efforts by federal legislative principals to rein in the disparate goals of judicial agents.272 In establishing
the Federal Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), Congress created an agent positioned between Congress and the courts that would
develop a set of guidelines to be followed in all federal sentencing
cases.273 Although Congress formed an independent commission
within the judicial branch, it retained a substantial amount of control
over the Commission, identifying the groups that the President had to
consult before appointing Commission members and prohibiting the
removal of appointed members except for cause.274 Congress also prevented the sentencing guidelines from becoming effective until 180

sures to ‘appear[ ] tough on crime’ ” (quoting Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Federal Criminal Sentencing
Reform, 11 J. LEGIS. 218, 231 (1984) (alteration in original))).
268 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 661; see also Rave, supra note 55, at 694 (“Any time one
person enlists another to act on his or her behalf, agency costs are present. Because their interests are not identical, there are costs involved in getting agents to act in the best interests of their
principals.”).
269

Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 670.

Id. at 666–67 (noting that it is difficult to identify the appropriate principal when applying the agency cost model to the administrative agency or judicial context, as the principal could
be the electorate or the legislature); Rave, supra note 55, at 694 (noting that Congress can be
viewed as an agent of the electorate and that “[t]he interests of politicians and their constituents
may diverge on many issues, and elections alone are not sufficient to bring their interests in
line”); Rave, supra note 55, at 718–19 (observing that “[a] major difference between the agency
problems in public and private law is in determining the interests of the principals” because if
the principal is the electorate, “[t]here are some interests that are nearly universally shared by
the people (for example, security or law and order), but on most issues the people’s interests will
diverge and will often be in direct conflict”).
270

271 Barkow, supra note 74, at 759 n.151 (noting that, regarding the proposal to form a commission comprised entirely of judges, “[t]he Senate rejected this proposal because they viewed
judges as the source of the disparity problem they were trying to solve”).
272

Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 670–72.

273

Id. at 672.

See Barkow, supra note 74, at 758 (describing the institutional design of the
Commission).
274
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days after they were issued, thus retaining the power to reject proposed guidelines in the interim.275
The progression of sentencing from individualized, discretionary
assessment to a uniform set of largely mandatory rules is far from a
story of unparalleled success. The sentencing guidelines were costly
to develop,276 judges complained of the costs of implementing the
guidelines in each case,277 and sentences have continued to increase—
in large part due to the guidelines themselves and prosecutors’ incentives to overcharge and obtain high mandatory sentences278—while
also remaining highly disparate. Indeed, using rules rather than standards to control agents can be costly.279 Complex problems demand
complex rules and thus threaten to make rules unmanageable.280 But
judicial application of the Bail Reform Act and similar state statutes
for more than two decades shows that standards have failed in the
pretrial context.281 And attempts by Congress to better match judicial
and congressional incentives through clear rules in the sentencing context provide valuable lessons, both positive and negative, for bail. Fixing bail requires addressing agency costs, and creating bail
commissions to craft and impose guidelines based on validated risk
assessment tools is a logical way of achieving that goal and reducing
pretrial detention. This Part develops this proposal and responds to
likely objections.
275 See id. at 760 (“This delay gives the legislature greater control than it has in the typical
agency scenario . . . .”).
276 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 673–74.
277 Id. at 674 (citing FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 137 (1990)) (“In a study by the Federal
Courts Study Committee, ninety percent of the judges responding to the survey said that the
guidelines have made sentencing procedures more, not less, time consuming.”).
278 See Bowman, supra note 135, at 1347 (“[T]he guidelines identify a host of offense-related aggravating factors (use of a weapon, injury to a victim, size of the loss, role in the offense)
that almost always increase the offense level, but they restrict judicial consideration of the most
common mitigating factors . . . .”).
279 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
562 (1992).
280 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 674 (“[W]here a decision is very complex, the rule
that is necessary to describe the desired result may be much more difficult to apply accurately
than a standard aimed at the same result.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of
Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1035, 1060 (2006) (“Some regulatory policy areas may involve only a handful of really
important questions. . . . This is conducive to a preference for delegation to agencies . . . . By
contrast, for statutes that require application of general standards to the facts of particular cases
on a more individualized basis . . . legislators would tend to favor delegation to courts because
such statutes implicate a larger number of discrete interpretive issues . . . .”).
281 See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text.

2016]

FIXING BAIL

459

A. Federal and State Bail Commissions
Careful consideration of the composition of the commissions
formed by Congress and state legislatures is important, as structural
decisions have lasting effects. In the sentencing context, Professor
Rachel Barkow and others note that Congress largely isolated the
Federal Sentencing Commission from political influence by creating
an independent commission.282 The Commission’s members can be
removed by the President only for cause.283 If Congress and state legislatures are similarly committed to avoiding the oftentimes small-yetpowerful interests’ continued call for widespread pretrial detention,
bail commissions, too, should be independent, with executive influence limited to initial selection of the members through a selection
process constrained by Congress and legislatures.
In the sentencing context, Congress attempted to further constrain political influence by carefully directing the types of individuals
whom the President should initially appoint, at first directing the President to select nonlegislative members (e.g., judges) to be on the Commission.284 Although the intentions behind this structure were valid
ones—allowing too much political influence would perpetuate the
tough-on-crime pressures faced by judges and legislators—Professor
Barkow believes that over-isolation of the Commission constrains certain powers that the Commission needs in order to be effective.285 For
example, Congress can currently strike down the Commission’s proposed sentences, and the Commission has little recourse when this occurs.286 Forming a bail commission that includes at least one
representative from the legislature might therefore be advisable—this
would ensure a degree of isolation from often-changing political
282 Barkow, supra note 74, at 717–18, 718 n.2; Bowman, supra note 135, at 1324 (noting that
one of the goals in creating the Commission was to provide a body of experts that would have
“some insulation from the distorting pressures of politics”).
283 Barkow, supra note 74, at 758.
284 Bowman, supra note 135, at 1323 (“Until 2003, the law required that at least three commissioners be federal judges. In 2003, the PROTECT Act abolished the requirement that there
be any judges on the Commission and restricted the number of judges who might serve at any
one time to no more than three.” (footnote omitted)); see also Barkow, supra note 74, at 758
(suggesting that Congress placed the Commission in the Judicial Branch precisely to enable
judges to serve on the Commission).
285 See Barkow, supra note 74, at 801 (“One way to facilitate legislative support is to include members of the legislature on the commission . . . .”).
286 For a discussion on Congress’s increasing intervention in the Commission’s work, including an amendment that “directed the Sentencing Commission to substantially reduce downward departures, [ ] limited to three the number of judges who can serve on the Sentencing
Commission,” and increased the number of specific directives, see Bowman, supra note 135, at
1341–42.
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forces but might give the commission more power.287 If the legislature
objected to the commission’s recommendations, its legislative member
could attempt to lobby for and defend the recommendations within
political debates.288
To ensure that an inclusive range of interests in pretrial detention
is represented on the commissions and that the commissions have the
expertise needed to write mandatory bail guidelines, in addition to
trained criminologists and statisticians, the bail commissions should
include judges, criminal defense experts, legislative representatives,
and prosecutors.289 Because pretrial detention is administered at several levels, Congress should form a federal bail commission, and state
legislatures should form a similar commission within each state. This
would leave out the municipalities, which face their own pretrial detention costs and benefits as a result of county and city judges’ bail
determinations, but forming commissions and guidelines at this small
of a level would be costly and would likely offset the benefits of reduced agency costs. Including municipal representation on each state
commission could better incorporate municipal concerns.
Bail bondsmen have much to gain or lose from mandatory guidelines and thus might also need to be included in commission membership.290 This approach could perhaps overly restrain progress. The
bail bondsman lobby has consistently and successfully resisted efforts
to expand pretrial release or even to increase representation pretrial.291 But for legislation forming bail commissions to have a chance
of success, at least one representative of this industry will need to be
included on the commission. Provided that the voting structure on the
commission afforded each commission member only one vote, the
representative of the bail bondsman industry would likely be unable
to block the mandatory guidelines, although it would likely try to tilt
them toward including money bail conditions—a move that might
continue to generate too much pretrial detention.292
287 Cf. Barkow, supra note 74, at 800, 802 (encouraging inclusion of legislators on sentencing commissions to help “persuade political actors outside the commission of the wisdom of the
agency’s policies” and noting state commissions that include legislators).
288

Cf. id. at 800, 802.

Cf. id. at 800–01 (in the sentencing context, advocating for a diverse commission membership that “enable[s] the commission to consider sentencing issues from a variety of perspectives that might otherwise be ignored”).
289

290

See supra notes 68–72, 99–102, and accompanying text.

291

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

292

See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
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B. The Content of Mandatory Bail Guidelines
Just as legislatures can use sentencing commissions as a helpful
model for forming bail commissions and predicting their likely success
or failure, existing actuarial approaches for assessing dangerousness
and likely flight risk in bail determinations provide a useful foundation to work from. Actuarial approaches, in contrast with bail schedules or sentencing guidelines, attempt to determine the factors that
most accurately predict flight risk rather than relying on the average
defendant or similarly rough metrics.293 Legislatures should direct bail
commissions to write mandatory bail grounded in validated actuarial
assessments. The actuarial model already used in the federal court
system for one-sixth of defendants (which is currently paired with judicial discretion, leading to over-detention)294 and the Public Safety
Assessment295 would be a good start, as would the model for dangerousness proposed and empirically tested by Professors Baradaran and
McIntyre.296 As explained in Part II, the federal actuarial model uses
a range of factors, such as the defendant’s criminal history, family in
the area, type of job and length of employment, and other data to
generate scores on the likely dangerousness and flight risk of a defendant. Unlike the federal model, the risks of dangerousness and flight
should be separately scored, as they are in the Public Safety Assessment.297 For predictions of dangerousness, Professors Baradaran and
McIntyre suggest similar factors to those used to predict flight risk;
they also suggest additional factors that can further improve the actuarial model.298
To convert this actuarial model into mandatory guidelines, the
bail commissions should set at least three score thresholds for flight
and dangerousness: thresholds representing low, moderate, and high
flight risk, and low, moderate, and high dangerousness. For defendants with scores below the low thresholds for flight risk and dangerousness, the guidelines should mandate that judges release the
defendants with a personal recognizance bond—a nonmoney bond
that simply involves a promise by the defendant to appear at trial. For
defendants with a flight risk score that is above the low threshold and
a dangerousness score below the low threshold (those with relatively
293
294
295
296
297
298

Slobogin, Dangerousness, supra note 137, at 121–23; supra Part I.A.
See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 41, 111, and accompanying text.
See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 233, at 3.
Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 553–54, 554 n.272.
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high flight risk and low dangerousness), the guidelines should mandate that judges release the defendant with conditions like monitoring
that would better ensure presence at trial, or money bail tied to the
defendant’s ability to pay (based on a percentage of the defendant’s
total available assets). This would change the current judicial use of
money bail schedules, which set static bail amounts based on the
charge involved and not on ability to pay—a practice that penalizes
the poor and fails to incentivize wealthy defendants to show up for
trial.299 For defendants with any level of flight risk and a dangerousness score above the high threshold (or perhaps moderate threshold,
depending on the commission’s deliberations300), judges should be required to detain the defendants.
In directing the formation of mandatory bail guidelines and requiring judges to follow these guidelines, legislatures should allow
very limited judicial departure from them—perhaps only in circumstances where the prosecutor provides, by clear and convincing evidence, that despite an actuarial score projecting only low or moderate
dangerousness, the defendant is in fact a danger to the community.
Judges should also be able to depart where defendants can show the
reverse—collecting clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate low
dangerousness despite an actuarial score of moderate to high dangerousness. And if the actuarial instrument used to generate the score
included the same factors that prosecutors or defendants attempted to
use to demonstrate dangerousness (such as a previous offense) or the
lack thereof (such as a defendant having strong family support), then
this evidence should not be a basis for departure.301 Allowing broader
departures would return us to the present system, in which even
judges that use actuarial models detain too many defendants by re299 See supra Part I.B.2. This occurs because the monetary amount is a small percentage of
a wealthy defendant’s total assets and is relatively trivial to the wealthy defendant.
300 Operationalizing the guidelines would of course require further thought by empiricists,
but this threshold should perhaps be quantified to prevent judges from deeming a low-risk percentage to mean “high” risk. Evidence suggests that could occur. For example, in one study a
majority of judges surveyed deemed a risk of dangerousness of twenty-six percent to be “high
risk” that justified civil commitment, yet researchers suggest that if this risk were communicated
as a seventy-four percent likelihood of the individual not being violent, judges would not deem
civil commitment to be necessary. See Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk Probabilities on Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions, 35 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 83, 85, 88 (2011) (citing John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decisions Thresholds for
Violence Risk Management, 2 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 1 (2003)).
301 See generally Slobogin, Dangerousness, supra note 137. In addition to his published
work, I am grateful to Professor Christopher Slobogin for his insights and discussions on this
point in his comments on this Article.
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viewing the actuarial recommendations and then relying on independent subjective risk assessments to make their final decision.302
As with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the question remains
whether legislatures should be able to review the guidelines before
they become effective.303 If the goal of the guidelines is to better align
apparent legislative goals with judicial actions, then the answer is easy.
But despite the ongoing pressure on legislatures to limit pretrial detention, particularly due to budgetary concerns, these pressures will
wane in times of economic plenty,304 and legislatures are less swayed
by the many valid yet largely ignored, justice-based, and constitutionally grounded arguments for pretrial release.305 And Congress is notorious for giving in to capture by small but highly powerful tough-oncrime interests,306 pressure that is only rarely offset by the large, dispersed, typically disorganized population that collectively experiences
the very negative impacts of pretrial detention.307
If legislatures are truly committed to attempting to fix the broken
pretrial process, they should likely bind themselves to having only limited ability to review the guidelines. As a compromise, the guidelines
and commissions could perhaps periodically sunset, allowing legislatures to reconsider the composition of the commission and the extent
of needed legislative influence over the guidelines. Legislatures
would also retain some influence over the bail commissions if they
included one or several legislative members on the commission, thus
further allaying fears of unbounded independent agency control.308
Legislatures might prefer this limited influence in some cases.
Granting control to an agency with the expertise to develop and adopt
risk assessment tools and corresponding bail guidelines allows legislatures to pass some of the blame for measures viewed as “soft on
crime” to the agency, yet also retain a degree of control over the conSee supra Part I.B.4.
See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
304 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 26, at 1308–09 (“States may often ignore direct costs [of
sentencing, such as incarceration costs], as well, when they are not facing budget pressures or
when tough-on-crime rhetoric is necessary because of an actual or perceived increase in crime.”).
305 Id.
306 See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081, 1090–92 (1993) (describing legislatures’ consistent undervaluing of
defendants’ rights).
307 Id.; see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
308 Cf. Barkow, supra note 74, at 760–62 (describing design features that Congress implemented in the U.S. Sentencing Commission to provide the legislature greater control than it
would have over a typical independent agency).
302
303
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tent and application of the guidelines.309 While the use of mandatory
guidelines has received strong criticism in the sentencing context,310
the arguments for their use are fundamentally stronger pretrial, and a
commission writing bail guidelines from a clean slate could benefit
from our experience with sentencing.311
Legislatures, however, might be particularly wary of handing
most of their discretion to bail commissions for fear of still bearing the
brunt of the blame that judges currently receive when released defendants flee or commit crimes.312 Voters might make the connection
to the legislature, noting that the legislature initially formed the commission. Although legislatures will balance the costs of pretrial incarceration with the costs of voter criticism for pretrial release errors,313
the costs of blame might be so high that they will be reluctant to shift
the current locus of blame from judges to themselves. However, the
role of the commissions in establishing bail guidelines—and the judges
that still make the ultimate, albeit limited-discretion bail decisions—
may help diffuse some of the blame and lower the costs of voter
criticism.
One significant barrier to implementation remains: although
there are existing, carefully validated actuarial models that bail commissions could adopt with little modification,314 someone must run the
model for each individual defendant in the federal and state systems.
Computers crunch the numbers, but for some of the models, humans
must interview defendants and obtain data to input into the computer
system.315 The systems that currently use actuarial models that require interviews rely on pretrial services agencies to do this work, and
309 See id. at 717–18 (“A commission could, in theory, provide needed political cover for
highly charged decisions.”).
310 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 135. But see Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 73 GEO. L.J. 225, 225 (1984) (concluding prior to the Sentencing Reform Act requiring the establishment of guidelines “that a full-time, increasingly
expert commission, with power to make and revise sentencing-guideline ranges, remains the best
available approach to making criminal penalties rational, fair, and suitably adaptable to changing
circumstances”).
311 See supra Part III.A.
312 Supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text
314 See supra Part II.B.1–2.
315 See supra Part II.B.1; cf. Joseph M. Zlatic, An Assessment of District Reviews: Implications for Pretrial Services Policy Development and Practice, FED. PROB., Sept. 2009, at 50, 50–51
(noting that in twenty-one percent of federal district courts’ pretrial services investigations reviews, there were “errors in the written report,” such as failing to complete a portion of the
report but that there was a “relatively low rate of erroneous risk assessment”). Not all models
require interviews, however. For example, the Public Safety Assessment does not require defen-
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this approach seems reasonably effective.316 Appointing individuals to
repeatedly conduct interviews and input data—with careful guidelines
and training for collecting accurate data and properly entering it into
the system—builds up expertise and helps to ensure that the actuarial
models will be relatively uniformly deployed.
C. Objections and Responses
In light of criticism of the United States Sentencing Commission,
the guidelines it produces, and the relatively expansive change in pretrial detention practices that mandatory bail guidelines will produce,
judges, policymakers, stakeholders, and scholars will likely raise a
range of objections, which will be considered here. While all of these
likely objections would require careful consideration, none seem to
overcome the benefits that mandatory bail guidelines offer—namely,
providing one of the few feasible means of curtailing currently high
agency costs in the pretrial process and creating meaningful pretrial
detention reform.
1. General Objections to Quantitative Risk Assessment
Professor Slobogin has extensively documented objections to
quantitative approaches to predicting dangerousness in the sentencing, plea bargaining, and civil commitment contexts, noting concerns
about the constitutionality of actuarial approaches, their accuracy, and
their implementation.317 This Article builds from his and others’ work
here, summarizing broad-based concerns and examining how they
might apply in the bail context.
a. Inaccuracy
Despite the seemingly overwhelming evidence that actuarial assessments of individuals’ risk are consistently more accurate than
clinical assessments,318 concerns about accuracy remain. These can
likely be relatively quickly dismissed by pointing to the historic and
ongoing studies of actuarial accuracy that continue to improve actuadant interviews in large part because officials indicated that interviews made actuarial models
too resource-intensive to be practical. See infra text accompanying note 356.
316 See supra Part II.B.1.
317 While this Article references Professor Slobogin’s work throughout this section, his
most relevant recent piece, which organizes actuarial concerns as falling within the categories of
constitutionality, accuracy, and implementation, is Slobogin, Plea Bargaining, supra note 137, at
24–34.
318 See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
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rial models;319 the fact that the federal government has spent years
testing, validating, and improving its model for evaluating pretrial defendants’ risks;320 and the ongoing testing and implementation of the
Public Safety Assessment tool.321 Thus, unlike clinical approaches,
under which mental health experts rely on an array of different factors
to assess likely risk and often do not disclose the factors they use,
actuarial models follow a uniform approach—one that we can continue to assess and improve.322 And although uniformity alone is no
guarantee of accuracy, validation has greatly improved the accuracy of
the models.323
We can further address accuracy concerns through research conducted outside of the assessment process, and through ongoing peer
review of the models used by pretrial agencies. Professors Baradaran
and McIntyre’s empirically tested model, for example, shows promise
for relying on scholars and others outside of the pretrial system to
continue to provide suggestions for improving the accuracy of models.324 And the fact that even the existing, albeit flawed, models appear to be more accurate than judicial assessments—which involve
nonclinician judges making highly varied dangerousness determinations—greatly alleviates these concerns.325 Of course, models can only
be as accurate as their inputs, and equal care must be given to carefully collecting data about each defendant.
b. Impersonal Decisions
Another objection to quantitative risk assessment, whether in the
pretrial, sentencing, or civil commitment contexts, is that the process
is highly impersonal and fails to treat defendants as individuals. Yet,
as Professor Slobogin notes in the context of general actuarial assessment, “statistical inference is individualized, or case-specific, in the
sense that it predicts the chances that a certain individual, because of
See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
See Cadigan, supra note 141, at 30–31.
321 See supra notes 233, 241–42, and accompanying text.
322 See supra Part II.A.
323 See Lowenkamp & Whetzel, supra note 141, at 33 (conducting an empirical assessment
of the federal pretrial risk assessment tool to identify the factors that most accurately predict
risk); Lowenkamp et al., supra note 139, at 5 (describing an experimental project to validate a
risk assessment tool); supra notes 210–19 (describing validation efforts).
324 See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 4, at 553 (“[O]ur predicted model can provide
guidance for judges to make more efficient decisions and increase the number of people released
pretrial while not causing increased danger to the public.”).
325 See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
319
320
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particular traits she possesses, will act out violently in the future.”326
To the extent that actuarial prediction of dangerousness and flight risk
does unfairly lump defendants into groups and fails to offer an individualized assessment, other protections such as speedy trial apply,327
and they can partially limit the harm of pretrial detention based on an
inaccurate prediction of dangerousness.328 More importantly, from a
comparative perspective, even if a judge talking to a defendant about
his past seems more personal than inputting numerous individualized
factors into a model, the current bail system is already highly impersonal. As introduced in Parts I and II, judges already make stereotypes based on gender, family status, and other “group”-based
factors,329 and it is not uncommon for numerous defendants to be
326 Slobogin, Dangerousness, supra note 137, at 125; see also Slobogin, Plea Bargaining,
supra note 137, at 29 (refuting objections that “making . . . predictions about individuals based
on data about groups is incoherent or impossible” and noting that clinical approaches involve
the grouping of individuals into stereotypical classes). But see Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014)
(“[In the sentencing context,] [t]he underlying regression models may provide reasonably precise
estimates of the average recidivism rates for the group of offenders sharing the defendant’s characteristics, but the uncertainty about what an individual offender will do is much greater, and
when it comes to predicting individual behavior, the models offer fairly modest improvements
over chance.”).
327 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
328 These protections are only partial, however. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1354
(“[D]espite speedy trial requirements, many defendants awaiting trial are detained for
months.”).
329 There are concerns that existing (nonactuarial) judicial stereotypes used in the pretrial
detention decision—as are permitted by the Bail Reform Act—would violate the Equal Protection Clause or substantive due process. However, the Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 747–48 (1987), rejected one substantive due process argument relating to the permissibility
of “punishing” defendants pretrial before detaining them, finding that pretrial detention was not
punishment and that the “[g]overnment’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.” Challenges to bail on Equal Protection grounds have also failed, although these challenges, for the most part, have not addressed
how bail treats individuals differently based, for example, on their family status. See, e.g., Schilb
v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 368–69 (1971) (affirming the constitutionality of a system that retained
one percent of the bail for administrative bail costs but did not charge this same one percent fee
of defendants released on personal recognizance); Commonwealth v. Hendrick, 257 A.2d 657,
667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969) (Hoffman, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a court’s affirmance of an
order denying a request to be released without bail, but finding that consideration of factors that
bear on the likelihood of appearance at trial, including “an accused’s residence, employment and
family status,” does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); see also Slobogin, Plea Bargaining,
supra note 137, at 25–27 (noting that the use of risk assessment factors like age, gender, and
socioeconomic status “is justified when it serves the compelling state interest of efficiently allocating resources aimed at protecting the public from serious criminal acts” and describing the
literature that raises equal protection concerns in this context); Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1394
n.228 (describing Professor Baradaran and others’ arguments that bail violates substantive due
process, but noting the difficulty that these arguments face under current doctrine). Thus, al-
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herded in to the courtroom at one time, with judges often giving each
defendant slightly more than two minutes, at best, to make their
case.330 Many of these defendants lack counsel,331 and even if they
have the benefit of a public defender, this defender often must scramble from one defendant to the next, frantically attempting through
rapid communications with each defendant to understand the charges
and find any indicia of nondangerousness and community ties that
would prevent pretrial flight.332 And if defendants could present clear
and convincing evidence that contradicted the outcome of the risk assessment model, as proposed here, this would likely weaken any constitutional objections, as Professor Slobogin notes in the plea
bargaining context.333
Further, the basis of some of the objections to the impersonal
nature of mandatory bail guidelines would seem, at their core, to be
largely one of accuracy. The argument is, essentially, that an actuarial
model will fail to examine all factors relevant to a judge’s assessment
because a computer, rather than a person, has made the assessment.334
But to the extent the argument sounds in human dignity by objecting
to the treatment of defendants as factors to be mechanically analyzed
rather than as humans to be judged, it can only be said that the price
of that individual treatment, measured in increased detention and it
concomitant harms, seems too high to bear.335

though there are legitimate arguments for the unconstitutionality of detaining defendants pretrial or sentencing them on the basis of certain classifications that predict dangerousness, these
arguments seem unlikely to make much headway in the bail context; cf. Starr, supra note 326, at
821 (arguing that evidence-based sentencing, which “formally incorporates discrimination based
on socioeconomic status and demographic categories into sentencing,” may violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
330

See Colbert et al., supra note 20, at 1755.

See id. at 1719 (“Most states do not consider the right to counsel to apply until a later
stage of a criminal proceeding—days, weeks or months after the pretrial release
determination.”).
331

332 For discussion of defender caseloads beyond the pretrial context, see Peter A. Joy, Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 205, 207 & n.12 (2011).
333

Slobogin, Plea Bargaining, supra note 137, at 25–28.

See Slobogin, Dangerousness, supra note 137, at 124 (noting that a “criticism associated
with actuarial prediction is that it cannot help neglecting pertinent characteristics of the individual evaluated”).
334

335 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text; cf. Slobogin, Dangerousness, supra note
137, at 125 (discussing actuarial assessments for dangerousness and responding to objections of
the impersonal nature of this approach, noting “the fact remains that actuarial prediction is at
least as accurate as clinical prediction at determining who is most likely to be violent”).
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c. Difficult Quantification
Related to concerns about the impersonal nature of the actuarial
assessment is the likely claim that as with sentencing, the pretrial decision is too complex to be subject to quantification.336 Indeed, this concern has partially proven to be true in the sentencing context, where
judges report that after the introduction of sentencing guidelines, they
now spend more time on each case and have difficulty forcing highly
varied circumstances into one sentencing category.337 The sentencing
decision is highly complex; individuals who have been convicted often
have been convicted on numerous charges, and their sentence might
also be affected by, inter alia, decisions about their character and remorse, their likely dangerousness, and previous convictions when
three-strikes laws apply.338 The guidelines might simply be too rigid to
afford justice to many defendants.339
The pretrial detention decision is also complex, of course, but the
decisions to be made are narrower and more easily quantified.340 The
judge’s task is not to mete out a nuanced sentence based on a range of
character- and charge-based factors, but rather to ask a relatively simple question: is the defendant likely to flee or commit a crime while
awaiting trial?341 And this question is somewhat more easily quantified. Because computers more accurately project dangerousness than
judges (although there is still room for improvement in computer
models)342 and because justice in the pretrial process relies largely on
336 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 661 (arguing that the “use of rules by the principal
to control agency costs will be less effective with more complex tasks because the administrative
and overbreadth costs of using a rule rise with the complexity of the task”).
337 Id. at 673–74 (noting that judges report having to spend more time on sentencing since
the introduction of the guidelines (citing FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 277, at 137)).
338 See id. at 665 (describing a “decision or task as more complex when it involves a greater
number of factors that must be taken into account to successfully execute the decision or task
consistent with the interests of the principal”).
339 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 277, at 137–38 (recognizing “defendant’s personal history, including such factors as age and employment history” as relevant to the sentencing decision yet not permitted to be considered under the federal sentencing guidelines).
340 Compare id., with Lowenkamp & Whetzel, supra note 141, at 34 (identifying “number
of prior felony convictions, number of prior failure-to-appears, pending charges, current offense
type, current offense level, age at interview, highest educational level, employment status, home
ownership, and substance abuse” as examples of “specific measures used in the development and
validation” of an actuarial risk assessment instrument).
341 See Lowenkamp & Whetzel, supra note 141, at 33 (describing “the scope of the court’s
concern [at the pretrial hearing stage] to include not only a defendant’s future court appearance
but also the safety of the community”).
342

See supra Part II.A.
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accurately assessing risks,343 relying on the superior quantifier of risk
seems preferable.
d. Disparate Treatment of Defendants
A final, important objection to deciding bail based on actuarial
predictions is that the bail guidelines would entrench existing disparities within the criminal justice system—a concern often raised in the
sentencing context.344 The U.S. system of arresting, charging, detaining, convicting, and imprisoning defendants is notoriously discriminatory. Police disproportionately target African-American individuals
in making traffic stops and arrests,345 and the percentage of African
Americans imprisoned (controlling for crime rate) is extremely high,
both viewed independently and as compared to other groups.346 Because it is more likely that an African-American individual will be
arrested and charged, making pretrial determinations partly on the
basis of criminal history and current charges can increase the likelihood that this individual will be detained pretrial, thus continuing the
disparate treatment that begins even before arrest. The current system, in which judges have a great deal of discretion, is subject to their
explicit or implicit biases, but objective standards can be just as problematic as subjective ones in entrenching bias.347
See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug
Offenses, 1991–1992, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 789, 793–96 (1997) (showing how ethnicity and race
contributed to sentencing disparities); Reva Siegel, Foreword, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 50 (2013) (noting how judicial review standards requiring a showing of purposive discriminatory impact caused courts to repeatedly reject challenges to “federal sentencing guidelines that imposed a 100:1 ratio in penalties for crack compared to powder cocaine”); Kate Stith,
The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J.
1420, 1472–73 (2008) (identifying the “crack-powder” disparity as one of the few areas where
“opposition to the [Sentencing] Guidelines regime” achieved “public salience,” but describing
how judges routinely rejected challenges to this portion of the guidelines).
345 See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 111–13 (1995) (showing major disparities between drug arrests of White and AfricanAmerican individuals); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and Unequal Hand: Pretextual
Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1413, 1477–78 (2000)
(noting disproportionate traffic stops for “disfavored groups” and the describing the New Jersey
case—a case that resulted in a consent decree—which highlighted this practice).
346 MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (1995) (describing the high percentages of African-American males in the criminal justice system); TONRY, supra note 345, at 28–30 (describing the
increasingly disproportionate representation of African Americans in jail, despite crime rates
remaining relatively steady, and surveying studies).
347 See Siegel, supra note 344, at 22–23 (noting “ ‘good-faith, colorblind decisions’ that
might foreseeably or knowingly entrench racial segregation” (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
343
344
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Although this is a serious concern, there is reason to believe that
actuarial bail guidelines could reduce racial disparities. Because the
models make testable predications, the outcomes of which can be
tracked,348 it is possible to detect and correct for disparate impacts.
Although no bail decisionmaking process can solve overcharging and
arrest problems, the bail guidelines can be written to avoid the addition of further additive bias at the bail stage. Guideline developers
can accomplish this by testing whether defendants of different races
and backgrounds receive different bail decisions despite facing the
same charges and exhibiting the same characteristics. If the guidelines
produce additive bias, the factors used to indicate low, moderate, or
high risk of flight and dangerousness can be modified and tested to
eliminate this bias. Indeed, the bail commissions that set the guidelines should be explicitly charged with the task of testing for and addressing any additive bias that might result. And although the
potential for discriminatory impacts remains a serious concern, the
early results are promising: the Arnold Foundation was aware of the
potential for discriminatory results and reports that its model produces race- and gender-neutral results.349
More broadly, any type of bail decision, whether actuarial or
clinical, will likely rely to some extent on the type of charges the defendant faces, and bail practices cannot solve the broader discriminatory problems inherent to the criminal justice system. Tackling these
larger problems would require a wholesale revision of arrest and
charging practices. But the guidelines can, and should, avoid adding
discrimination to an already flawed system; because actuarial models
(as compared to judicial discretion) are more easily tested for bias and
can be modified to avoid bias, they are superior to the current approach, although they are by no means perfect. Moreover, the fact
that fewer people were detained pretrial after certain jurisdictions introduced actuarial assessment into its pretrial system350 suggests that
guidelines can, to some degree, help moderate the pattern of arrest,
overcharging, pretrial detention, guilty pleas, and prison time.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 510 (1979)); Stith, supra note 344, at 1437–40 (describing how the Sentencing Guidelines attempted to make the sentencing process more uniform by assigning just one
person—a probation officer—to identify facts, make an “initial calculation of the defendant’s
Guidelines range” for the judge based on the Guidelines; and noting that one flaw of this system,
which resulted in racial disparities and other problems, was that it “directly constrained only
judges,” not prosecutors).
348 See supra Part II.A.
349 See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 210.
350 See supra note 232.
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2. Cost
As is the case with any proposal, and particularly for proposals to
improve the functioning of the criminal justice system, costs are a concern. Legislatures are still wrestling with budget problems created by
the slow recovery from the 2008 recession, and are generally hesitant
to expend tax dollars on criminal justice reform.351 The costs of the
commissions and pretrial services agencies themselves would likely be
relatively low—the annual budget for the U.S. Sentencing Commission was $17 million in 2013,352 and it was $4 million for federal pretrial services and probation (excluding the federally funded pretrial
services agency that serves Washington, D.C. courts).353 And as discussed above, pretrial risk assessments, which do not require detailed
analysis of culpability, would likely be less expensive.354 States that
wished to avoid these costs, moreover, could probably rely on the outputs of other commissions. Moreover, a growing number of states,
along with the District of Columbia, already have pretrial services
agencies,355 thus alleviating the need to form new and expensive institutions in these cases. Indeed, as introduced in Part II, the soon-to-be
nationally applicable Public Safety Assessment does not require resource-intensive defendant interviews.356 But, for the many jurisdictions that do not already have robust pretrial services agencies with
personnel to conduct the necessary interviews and collect defendant
data, the additional costs would be more significant. The existing evidence strongly suggests that these expenditures would be more than
See supra 93–94 and accompanying text.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOV’T 61 (2013) (on file with The George Washington Law Review).
353 Id. at 54, 58 (explaining that this budget includes pretrial services officer salaries and
benefits). The federally funded Washington, D.C., pretrial services agency is more expensive,
with a budget of $29.4 million in fiscal year 2014 (excluding the cost of “drug specimen collection” and “drug testing”). Clifford T. Keenan, Pretrial Servs. Agency for the District of Columbia, It’s About Results, Not Money, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., http://www.psa.gov/
?q=node/499 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). This expense might be in part due to the fact that the
Agency is not housed within another agency or division and thus includes “administrative support functions” that other pretrial services agencies typically do not shoulder. Id.
354 See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
355 See, e.g., PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND PERFORMANCE REQUEST: FISCAL YEAR 2014 3 (2013), http://www
.csosa.gov/about/financial/budget/2014/FY14-PSA-Budget-Submission.pdf (describing the Pretrial Services Agency for Washington, D.C., a federal agency created under the District of Columbia Bail Agency Act of 1967 that conducts “a risk assessment for every arrested person who
will be presented in court” and “formulat[es] release or detention recommendations based upon
this risk assessment”).
356 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 233, at 4–5.
351
352
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offset by the resulting declines in detention and its associated costs,357
but it could still be difficult to persuade some legislatures to act. In
these circumstances, as a second-best approach, jurisdictions with legislatures who refused to implement mandatory guidelines could still
reduce agency costs by following the weaker options discussed in Part
I. While tracking and publishing judges’ release rates358 and enacting
legislation that requires judges to give due consideration to actuarial
data have some costs,359 they are likely far lower360 than implementing
this Article’s guidelines-based system.
3. Constitutional Objections
In light of numerous and sometimes successful constitutional
challenges to the sentencing guidelines,361 critics will likely argue that
similar constitutional concerns arise with mandatory bail guidelines.
Yet the bail process is sufficiently different from sentencing to avoid
most of these concerns.
Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial do not attach in the bail
context—although some scholars have argued that they should362—
thus making Blakely v. Washington363 and United States v. Booker364
largely inapplicable to the pretrial process. In Blakely and Booker,
the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court addressed the problem of
the sentencing guidelines’ requirement that judges make certain find357 See, e.g., PEPIN, supra note 35, at 8 (describing how in 2010 “Harris County[, Texas,]
gained $4,420,976 in avoided detention costs and pretrial services fees collected after deducting
for the costs of pretrial services”); Keenan, supra note 353 (citing high jail costs and arguing that
“[p]erhaps the best reason that any jurisdiction should provide the necessary funding for an
effective pretrial services function is that anything less actually costs more”). The Agency
spends approximately $29.4 million annually on 21,000 cases, or $1408 per case, whereas cities
like New York spend approximately $45,000 to jail each pretrial detainee. See Keenan, supra
note 353; CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 26, at 5.
358 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
359 See supra Part I.B.4.
360 See, e.g., State Profiles, BUREAU JUST. STAT., www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=481#
Summary (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (showing Bureau of Justice Statistics grants to states, which
are distributed in exchange for permission to collect and publish certain information about the
recipient state’s criminal justice system, with grant amounts typically under $200,000 per state).
361 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (changing Federal Sentencing Guidelines from having mandatory to advisory status because the mandatory Guidelines
created an unconstitutional judicial role in sentencing).
362 See Appleman, supra note 7, at 1365–66 (arguing for “bail juries” in part because
“[a]llowing the community to observe and participate in the routine preventative detention hearing of a domestic defendant . . . would vindicate a number of rights, including . . . the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial right”).
363 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
364 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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ings of fact about defendants and set sentences accordingly, without
much ability to depart from the mandatory sentence.365 These factual
findings were constitutionally within the “province of the jury,” not
the judge.366
In the pretrial context, on the other hand, in addition to the lack
of any jury right, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive bail imposes very little restraint on the government’s pretrial methods and outcomes.367 It simply requires that the government’s method of assuring the defendant’s
presence at trial not be substantially broader than necessary to
achieve governmental interests, such as preventing dangers to
society.368
Further, the Supreme Court emphasized in United States v. Salerno369 that Congress has a strong interest in protecting public safety
and may accordingly direct judges in their pretrial determinations.370
Although it did not directly address a separation of powers claim, this
language would likely counter any arguments that mandatory guidelines handed down by a commission created at the behest of Congress
unconstitutionally interfered with judicial powers.371 Equal Protection
objections to mandatory bail guidelines seem similarly unlikely to succeed, assuming the actuarial model avoids the use of suspect classifications.372 And any procedural due process concerns are probably
mitigated by allowing departures from actuarial predictions on deSee Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304; Booker, 375 F.3d at 511–12.
See Booker, 375 F.3d at 512 (Posner, J.) (“The finding of facts (other than the fact of the
defendant’s criminal history) bearing on the length of the sentence is just what the Supreme
Court in Blakely has determined to be the province of the jury.”); see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at
304 (noting the case involved a Sixth Amendment issue and that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the
law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority.” (citation
omitted) (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; OR, PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872))).
365
366

367 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987) (“[W]e reject the proposition that the
Eight Amendment categorically prohibits the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial release.”).
368 Id. at 747 (“Nor are the incidents of pretrial detention excessive in relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve.”).
369

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).

Id. at 749 (“The government’s interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.”).
370

371

See id.

See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that
suspect classifications “are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest
that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy”).
372
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fendants’ submission of clear and convincing evidence refuting the
prediction.373
4. Lobbying Pressures
Beyond constitutional objections, opponents of mandatory bail
guidelines are likely to point out that judges, although sometimes
elected, might be less subject to lobbying pressures than an appointed
commission. A growing public choice literature has, after all, recognized that agencies might be as susceptible to narrow special interest
groups’ lobbying pressures as Congress is, or even more so.374
This is a valid concern, but again, the current system is likely
worse. The mandatory bail guidelines process would at least be relatively open and transparent—provided that Congress included adequate measures for notice-and-comment rulemaking and
opportunities for public review.375 And this open, relatively centralized process seems far superior, from an accountability perspective, to
the thousands of discrete bail decisions made by judges around the
country, often in the course of only several minutes.376
From an efficiency perspective, it will be far cheaper, and likely
more effective, to monitor the actions of one federal bail commission
and fifty state commissions than it will be to monitor individual
judges; to the extent that a system of improved monitoring instead
relied on expanded attorney representation in the bail process, attorneys would have varied competency and resources, and thus
See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1241, 1280 (1989) (arguing that “[h]istory provides numerous examples of agency capture by the narrow constituency the agency was created
to control” and that the judiciary should play a role of making agencies more accountable to the
electorate, their principals); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 350–56 (1974) (providing one of the early, classic accounts of agency
capture); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
GEO. L.J. 97, 100–06 (2000) (summarizing the public choice literature and the subset of capture
theory as applied to agencies but noting scholarship that also defends agency independence and
accountability).
375 This same benefit has been noted in the sentencing context. See, e.g., Bowman, supra
note 135, at 1328 (noting that at least in theory, “bringing law to sentencing promotes transparency, such that one can ascertain from the record many, if not all, of the factors which were
dispositive in generating the final sentence”); id. at 1347 (noting that the sentencing guidelines
brought “sentencing decisionmaking into the light in an unprecedented way” and that “[n]ot
only do judges now impose sentences that correlate directly to identified sentencing factors, but
the Commission’s ongoing work in gathering and disseminating sentencing data has made informed discussion about those factors possible”).
376 See supra note 20 and accompanying text; Bowman, supra note 135, at 1347.
373
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nonuniform monitoring effectiveness. Although centralized, relatively accessible commissions would be at a much higher risk of capture, procedural protections could mitigate this risk.377
5. The Potential for Overcharging
Much of the criticism against the sentencing guidelines, which
have generally had the seemingly unintended effect of creating longer
sentences,378 might also be raised in the bail context. Much of the
increase in sentence length appears to be the result of prosecutors taking advantage of required sentence lengths and overcharging to rack
up as many threatened years of imprisonment as possible, without the
potential for a judicial safety valve, thus contributing to longer average sentences.379
Bail guidelines seem unlikely to further incentivize overcharging,
and, if anything, they might reduce it. Prosecutors focus primarily on
the sentence when they charge a defendant—the pretrial process is a
short step toward what the prosecutor hopes will be a quick plea with
a relatively harsh sentence, a result that will generate praise and
“points” in the prosecutor’s career.380 But prosecutors might sometimes overcharge in order to reduce the likelihood that the defendant
will be released pretrial381 because in both the federal and state contexts, judges are directed to automatically detain defendants facing
certain types of charges.382 Prosecutors who were particularly worried
about the defendant’s dangerousness or possibility of flight might use
this law to their advantage.383 Mandatory bail guidelines could make
the criminal charge only one factor of many to be considered in a
defendant’s likely dangerousness, thus removing the strength of the
See Spence & Cross, supra note 374, at 99–100, 99 n.14.
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 26, at 1277 (“The politics of sentencing over the past three
decades have consistently produced longer prison terms and an escalation in tough-on-crime
rhetoric, regardless of whether crime rates have been going up or down.”).
379 Id. at 1282–83.
380 See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 863 (1995) (“The prosecutor
can, and regularly does, use discretion in charging to influence greatly a defendant’s decision to
plead guilty in any particular case.”).
381 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (exploring prosecutors’ likely incentives
against pretrial reform); cf. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 39–41 (1964) (suggesting prosecutors believe that “[i]f the present system of requiring
bail for some reason or other stopped producing a high rate of pretrial confinement, it would
have to be replaced by one that did.”).
382 See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 42, at 392–95, 396 n.326.
383 See id. at 340.
377
378
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charge in ensuring pretrial detention.384 And to fully eliminate the
importance of the charge to pretrial decisions, the guidelines would
ideally require consideration of the defendant’s conduct—not the
charge—in the actuarial model predicting dangerousness and flight
risk. Furthermore, because prosecutors’ charging decisions are typically tied directly to sentencing,385 mandatory bail guidelines seem unlikely to change their charging calculus.
6. The Failure to Adequately Capture Municipal Costs and
Benefits
A final objection to mandatory bail guidelines is that if the objective is to align governments’ bail incentives more closely with judges’,
and particularly to capture governments’ cost-benefit assessment of
pretrial detention, municipalities will be left out of this process. A
federal bail commission and state commissions would write the
mandatory bail guidelines proposed here; this might omit the concerns
of the many cities and counties that pay for the costs of constructing
and maintaining jails. But as introduced above, creating thousands of
municipal bail commissions to write their own guidelines would be
enormously costly and would offset many of the benefits of curtailing
agency costs.386 Including municipal representatives on state commissions would at least partially capture municipal cost concerns within
the guidelines created and would avoid the costs of municipal
commissions.
CONCLUSION
The bail system is stubbornly resistant to reform. Its problems
have been known for decades, but detention rates remain high, and in
some cases are even rising. One promising path of reform—the use of
actuarial models to better predict dangerousness—has made some inroads. The federal courts use actuarial models for approximately onesixth of criminal defendants,387 and a growing number of states have
pretrial agencies input data into actuarial models and make recommendations to judges regarding the defendant’s pretrial status.388 The
ongoing testing of a nationally applicable actuarial model for projecting flight risk and dangerousness further demonstrates the potential of
384
385
386
387
388

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 377–79.
Meares, supra note 380, at 863.
supra Part III.C.2.
supra note 246 and accompanying text.
supra notes 220–43 and accompanying text.
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actuarial approaches in pretrial release decisions.389 Yet all of these
systems, and the sparse literature proposing their use in the bail context,390 rely on judges to make the final determination. And, as described in this Article, judges’ incentives are skewed in favor of
detention: they face few penalties for detaining low-risk defendants,
receive no praise for correctly releasing them, and bear the brunt of
public criticism for releasing defendants who go on to evade trial or
commit violent crimes.391 Judges do not bear the societal costs associated with pretrial detention.
This Article has provided a theoretical basis for the importance of
reducing agency costs and improving accuracy in bail decisions
through the use of mandatory bail guidelines based on actuarial models. As it stands, legislatures’ goals to expand pretrial release—incentives embodied within existing statutes directing judges how to make
pretrial decisions—have not been faithfully carried out by their judicial agents, due, in part, to the significant divergence between judges’
and legislatures’ incentives.392
Other solutions are possible—legislatures could better monitor
their judicial agents by appointing attorneys to represent defendants
at pretrial hearings or by eliminating the use of money bail.393 But
both of these approaches are politically difficult as a result of strong
bail bondsmen influence394 and the expense of inserting an attorneymonitor into each of the thousands of pretrial hearings that occurs
annually.395 More promisingly, albeit more modestly, judges’ bail decisions could be tracked, rated, and made available to public.396 None
of these solutions would be as effective at reducing agency costs as
limiting judicial discretion through mandatory, actuarial guidelines.
The commissions implementing the guidelines—unlike judges—would
be sensitive to both the costs and the benefits of pretrial release.
While the sentencing guidelines have shown that implementing
this type of system can be difficult, pretrial decisions are meaningfully
different: they involve a more limited set of questions relating to dangerousness and flight risk that are more easily quantified than
389 See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 233, at 4–5; supra note 245 and accompanying text.
390 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
391 See supra Part I.A.
392 See supra Part I.
393 See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
394 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
395 See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
396 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
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nuanced considerations that go into punishment decisions.397 Other
objections, too, such as the imperfect and impersonal nature of actuarial models, have little force in light of how impersonal and inaccurate
the current system is.398 Mandatory guidelines represent a path forward, and in the current era of shrunken budgets and declining crime,
change may be achievable. But even if that path is not taken, it is
clear that to fix bail, we must address the principal-agent problem at
the heart of the system.

397
398

See supra Parts III.C.1.c.
See supra Parts III.C.1.a–b.

